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BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT POST-KOONTZ: HOW THE 
SUPREME COURT INVADED LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
Sean F. Nolon* 
Abstract 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water 
Management District injected significant confusion into negotiations over 
land development approvals. The principal source of this confusion is the 
majority’s unwillingness to clarify when and how a proposed condition 
offered in a negotiation becomes a demand that triggers heightened 
scrutiny under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court 
decided that government demands made prior to a later denial must be 
evaluated in the same manner as conditions imposed as part of an approval. 
Specifically, conditions designed to mitigate harmful development impact 
that are demanded from an applicant prior to a denial must now satisfy the 
heightened-scrutiny requirements of Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard instead of the relatively 
deferential Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City takings test. 
This heightened scrutiny will likely cause land use boards to be more rigid, 
and therefore less creative, in the development approval processes. 
While not fatal to land use negotiations, this expansion of the Nollan–
Dolan scrutiny will have consequences. Because Koontz now requires 
government offers in negotiations to meet this more exacting standard, the 
practical effect of Koontz is that land use boards get more favorable 
judicial review by denying noncompliant proposals without suggesting 
mitigating conditions. This will lead prudent boards to favor denials over 
negotiation as a way to preserve their advantage if a property owner 
challenges their decision in court as an unconstitutional taking without just 
compensation. 
This Article explains why Koontz makes land use negotiations less 
efficient and describes several ways land use boards can protect themselves 
while still taking advantage of opportunities in negotiation. Part I looks at 
the law of exactions in light of Koontz. Part II discusses the important role 
of negotiation in the land use approval process. Part III explores the 
consequences of Koontz on future land use negotiations and explains how 
courts can help maintain the efficiency of land use negotiations in the face 
of the challenges created by Koontz. Part IV suggests that land use boards 
have the following options when approving land use developments: avoid 
negotiation; facilitate negotiation without participating; negotiate without 
making proposals; negotiate; or attempt to insulate negotiations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Koontz v. St. 
Johns River Water Management District1 will drastically change the way 
thousands of land use boards interact with landowners seeking to develop 
their land. Post-Koontz, any suggestions made by the government during 
the development review process may become subject to a heightened level 
of judicial scrutiny. While the rationale for this greater oversight is to 
protect property owners from extortionate demands of government, the 
practical effect of this oversight will be to impede developers’ ability to 
improve their projects in the development review process. This Article 
addresses the complications the Koontz ruling presents for landowners and 
land use boards when they are negotiating over noncompliant applications.  
In 1994, Coy Koontz Sr. submitted an application to Florida’s St. Johns 
River Water Management District (the District) to develop 3.7 acres of 
wetlands in exchange for placing a conservation easement on his remaining 
eleven acres of land.2 The technical staff of the District informed Koontz 
that his proposal did not comply with existing regulations.3 A compliant 
application would have protected ten acres of non-wetlands for each acre 
of wetlands destroyed.4 Before the District staff recommended to their 
governing board that the application be denied, they gave Koontz several 
options.5 Among those options, they suggested that Koontz resubmit a 
compliant application that only destroyed one acre of wetlands while 
preserving the remaining acreage of the parcel.6 They also suggested that 
Koontz could develop the 3.7 acres if he agreed to spend money to 
improve wetlands at another location in the same watershed.7 Koontz 
refused the District’s suggestions and sued, alleging that the District’s 
denial after he refused to accede to their suggestions amounted to a taking 
without just compensation.8  
For over three decades, the Supreme Court has held land use boards to a 
heightened standard of review when they require noncompliant 
development proposals to dedicate a portion of their property as a 
                                                                                                                     
 1. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
 2. Id. at 2592.  
 3. Id. at 2593. 
 4. Brief for Respondent, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 
(2013) (No. 11-1447), 2012 WL 6694053, at *12; see Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593 (noting that the 
District wanted Koontz to proceed with the 3.7-acre development project and to “enhance[] 
approximately 50 acres of District-owned wetlands”).  
 5. Final Order, In re Coy A. Koontz Wetland Res. Mgmt. Permit Application No. 12-095-
0109A, Case No. F.O.R. 94-1498, at 1626–29 (St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. filed June 9, 
1994) [hereinafter Final Order, No. F.O.R. 94-1498].  
 6. Id. at 1628–29. 
 7. Id. at 1627–28. 
 8. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592–93. 
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condition of their approval.9 If these dedications—commonly called 
“exactions”—took place outside of the approval process through 
condemnation proceedings, they would violate the property owner’s Fifth 
Amendment right to be protected from government takings “without just 
compensation.”10 The Court justifies this heightened review on the premise 
that property owners need to be protected from the government’s ability to 
circumvent the Takings Clause by demanding property “exactions” through 
the development approval process.11  
Exactions are demands for dedications of land and payment of fees in 
exchange for permission to develop land more intensively than otherwise 
permitted.12 The purpose of an exaction is to mitigate the potential harm 
caused by a development that does not comply with existing laws.13 
Because these demands can approximate non-compensatory takings that 
violate the Fifth Amendment, the Court requires governments to show that 
a “nexus” and “rough proportionality” exist between the exaction and the 
threatened harm. The two cases imposing these requirements are Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission14 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.15 The 
“nexus” requirement of Nollan obligates the government to show that the 
burden imposed on the landowner is connected to the authority of the 
board.16 For example, a government that issues a demand to protect 
wetlands in exchange for permission to destroy wetlands must be 
authorized to protect wetlands in the first place. The “rough 
proportionality” requirement of Dolan also places the burden on the 
approving board to show that the exaction is likely to reduce the threatened 
harm.17 Governments that fail to satisfy the burden that their exactions 
meet either requirement may have to compensate the landowner for the 
property taken. 
This heightened standard is in contrast to the deferential scrutiny used 
by the Court when deciding non-exaction takings challenges. The default 
approach to non-exaction takings challenges places the burden of proof on 
the developer to demonstrate the relevant factors under the analytical 
framework established in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 
                                                                                                                     
 9. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005). 
 10. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 11. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546–47.  
 12. Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 478–79 (1991) (describing an 
exaction as a condition attempting to cure a non-compliant applications); see infra notes 65–69 for 
discussion of how the term “exaction” is also used broadly to describe conditions placed on 
compliant applications. 
 13. See Been, supra note 12, at 482.  
 14. 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (coining the “nexus” requirement). 
 15. 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (coining the “rough proportionality” requirement). 
 16. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.  
 17. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.  
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City.18 In these cases, the Court will examine “[t]he economic impact of 
the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the 
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,” as 
well as “the character of the governmental action.”19 This burden is very 
hard for developers to overcome. As a result, courts will afford a more 
favorable standard of review to land use boards that deny noncompliant 
applications than those that grant approval subject to a condition.20  
An open question after the Nollan and Dolan decisions was whether 
proposed exactions were subject to the same heightened scrutiny as 
imposed exactions. This was one of the questions the Court addressed in 
Koontz.21 Clearly, conditions imposed through an adjudicative development 
approval process must comply with Nollan and Dolan, but what if a board 
proposes a condition, the developer refuses, and the board then denies the 
project? Would this proposed exaction be subject to heightened review 
under Nollan and Dolan?  
According to both the majority and the dissent in Koontz, land use 
boards cannot circumvent the Takings Clause by denying the application of 
a developer who refused to accede to an exaction demand.22 The Justices 
disagreed, however, on what type of pre-approval negotiation behavior 
amounted to a “demand” triggering Nollan and Dolan scrutiny. The 
majority offered no guidance to distinguish a demand from a suggestion, 
offer, or proposal,23 while the dissent explained why no demand was made 
in Koontz.24 The result leaves land use boards with little direction about 
what form of negotiation behavior will be considered a “demand” 
triggering heightened scrutiny. This uncertainty is significant because 
exactions are so prevalent,25 and negotiations play such an important role 
                                                                                                                     
 18. See 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 19. Id.  
 20. While many scholars feared that the heightened review of Nollan and Dolan would 
discourage the use of exactions, the impact of the rulings remains unclear. Compare Ann E. Carlson 
& Daniel Pollak, Takings on the Ground: How the Supreme Court’s Takings Jurisprudence Affects 
Local Land Use Decisions, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 142 (2001) (reporting that a “very large 
percentage of municipal planners view the Supreme Court takings precedents favorably”), with Erin 
Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and Promise of Bargaining in Land Use 
Planning Conflicts, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 337, 366–68 (2002) (citing interviews with planners 
from Tigard, Oregon, who discuss how “the planning process has become more formal but less 
creative” since the Nollan and Dolan decisions).  
 21. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600 (2013).   
 22. Id. at 2591; id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 23. See id. at 2598 (majority opinion). 
 24. Id. at 2604, 2611 (Kagan, J., dissenting).   
 25. Mark Fenster, Failed Exactions, 36 VT. L. REV. 623, 623 & n.8 (2012) [hereinafter 
Fenster, Failing Exactions] (quoting JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, 
LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 9.9, at 345 (2d ed. 2007) (“An ever 
increasing number of local governments—even those without full scale growth management 
programs—have adopted policies and programs designed to make new development and not 
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in identifying appropriate exactions.26  
This Article argues that Koontz will change the way land use boards 
interact with landowners who submit development proposals that do not 
comply with governing laws and regulations. Pre-Koontz, land use boards 
would commonly offer suggestions on how to improve noncompliant 
development applications.27 If the developer did not want to incorporate 
the suggestions, she could refuse and her application would then likely be 
denied.28 If she challenged the denial as a taking, she would have to show 
how the board’s denial went too far under Penn Central.29 However, post-
Koontz, the confusion surrounding how a suggestion becomes a demand 
will likely cause boards to be more hesitant to offer pre-application 
suggestions.30  
Part I of this Article looks at the law of exactions in light of Koontz. 
Part II discusses the important role negotiation plays in the land use 
approval process. Part III explores the consequences of Koontz on future 
land use negotiations and explains how future courts can help restore the 
efficiency of land use negotiations. Finally, Part IV evaluates the following 
options available to land use boards post-Koontz: avoid negotiation; 
facilitate negotiation without participating; negotiate without making 
proposals; negotiate; and attempt to insulate negotiations. This Article’s 
Conclusion addresses some of the implications of this ruling and 
contemplates ways that courts applying Koontz can clarify what behavior 
amounts to a demand.  
I.  LAND USE EXACTIONS—NOLLAN, DOLAN, AND KOONTZ 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, 
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,31 prevents the 
government from taking property for “public use, without just 
compensation.”32 This prohibition applies to direct appropriation as well as 
                                                                                                                     
existing residents bear the cost of new capital improvements . . . necessitated by the new 
development.” (alteration in original)). 
 26. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 20, at 377. 
 27. See, e.g., id. at 338, 358–59.  
 28. See, e.g., id. at 358–59.   
 29. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 277, 290–
92 (2011) (characterizing the unconstitutional takings theory in Koontz as unusual, but pointing out 
that Koontz was unlikely to prevail under the Penn Central test, which is ordinarily applied in 
regulatory takings cases); see also infra notes 44–54 and accompanying text (discussing the 
application of the Penn Central test). 
 30. See infra Part III; see also Jeremy P. Jacobs, Takings Decision Confounds Experts, Spurs 
Accusations of Judicial Activism, GREENWIRE (June 26, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/stories
/1059983522 (quoting Coy Koontz, Jr., who stated that the decision “will give [developers] a 
bigger stick to take into court in the future to fight these types of cases”). 
 31. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).  
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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regulations that accomplish the same effect.33 In 2005, Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor penned a unanimous decision in Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc. to 
clarify how the Takings Clause applies to regulatory behavior.34 Justice 
O’Connor wrote that “[t]he paradigmatic taking requiring just 
compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of 
private property.”35 She continued, stating the Court had recognized earlier 
that “government regulation of private property may, in some instances, be 
so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster—
and that such ‘regulatory takings’ may be compensable under the Fifth 
Amendment.”36 
Direct appropriation is typically achieved by the government taking 
title37 to land—such as seizing a coal mine to prevent a national strike of 
coal miners38—or behavior that results in a complete or partial physical 
occupation of land—such as building a dam that causes water to flood 
upstream properties.39 As for regulatory takings, Justice O’Connor in 
Lingle describes four categories of regulatory takings. She began by 
writing that “two categories of regulatory action [will generally] be deemed 
per se takings.”40 The first of these two categories occurs “where 
government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of 
her property—however minor.”41 The second per se regulatory taking 
category “applies to regulations that completely deprive an owner of ‘all 
economically beneficial us[e]’ of her property.”42 A third category 
“involve[s] Fifth Amendment takings challenges to adjudicative land-use 
exactions—specifically, government demands that a landowner dedicate an 
easement allowing public access to her property as a condition of obtaining 
a development permit.”43  
                                                                                                                     
 33. Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537–38 (2005). 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 537.  
 36. Id. (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).  
 37. Or some form of title such as a conservation easement. See infra note 43 and 
accompanying text.  
 38. See, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115–17 (1951) (finding that an 
unconstitutional taking occurred when the government seized a coal mine to prevent a national coal 
miner strike without providing just compensation). 
 39. See, e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 182 (1871).  
 40. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538. 
 41. Id. (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)). 
 42. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 
(1992)). 
 43. Id. at 546 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379–80 (1994) and Nollan v. 
Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987)); see also Been, supra note 12, at 478–79 
(“Exactions require that developers provide, or pay for, some public facility or other amenity as a 
condition for receiving permission for a land use that the local government could otherwise 
prohibit.”). Note that Professor Vicki Been’s definition of exaction specifies that the developer’s 
proposal is noncompliant. 
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Regulatory takings challenges that fall outside of these three categories 
are constrained by the guidelines established in a preceding case44—Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.45 Under Penn Central, the 
fourth category, courts look to “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on 
the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.”46 The courts also 
look to whether “the character of the government action” more closely 
resembles a physical occupation or diminution of a property interest than a 
“public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to 
promote the common good.”47 While the Penn Central factors have “given 
rise to vexing subsidiary questions—[they] have served as the principal 
guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims that do not fall within the 
physical takings or Lucas rules.”48 While not setting out a bright-line 
rule,49 the Court held that the Penn Central factors have “particular 
significance” for evaluating regulatory takings claims.50 Using the 
framework of Lingle, determining the category of a regulatory taking is 
relatively simple. Regulations that impose a physical occupation fall in the 
first category. Regulations that remove all economically viable use fall into 
the second category. Government demands that development be 
conditioned on the dedication of property fall into a third category of 
exactions. And everything else falls into the final fourth Penn Central 
category of takings.  
A.  Heightened Scrutiny for Exactions 
Under all but the exaction cases, the burden is on the property owner to 
prove the facts of her case.51 Once she shows that the regulation results in 
forced occupation,52 or no economically viable use remains,53 
compensation is required under the Takings Clause. Similarly, under Penn 
                                                                                                                     
 44. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538. 
 45. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 46. Id. at 124. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539; see supra note 42 and accompanying text for the requiments of 
Lucas. 
 49. See Stephen Durden, Unprincipled Principles: The Takings Clause Exemplar, 3 ALA. 
C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 25, 27 (2013) (“In the 30 plus years since Penn Central, the Court has 
struggled to create a sense of coherence in its interpretation of the Takings Clause in general and the 
Penn Central test in particular.”); James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Weighing the Need to 
Establish Regulatory Takings Doctrine to Justify Takings Standards of Review and Principles, 34 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 315, 351 (2010) (referencing the “confusion surrounding the 
three-prong analytical inquiry of Penn Central”). 
 50. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
 51. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543 (“[T]he Takings Clause presupposes that the government has 
acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose.”). 
 52. E.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982). 
 53. E.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992). 
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Central, the landowner must prove that the government regulation does not 
meet the standards.54 These review standards set a high bar for landowners 
to overcome when asking a court to decide whether a regulation violated 
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. However, when a land use 
board demands an unconstitutional condition in the course of an 
adjudicative development decision the Court applies a different test.55  
Exaction cases arise in the context of a development application. When 
a property owner submits an application to develop her land, the governing 
land use board must follow an adjudicative process to determine her right 
to develop. If the development application does not comply with the 
governing land use laws and regulations, the board can suggest conditions 
that would bring the application into compliance. If a condition 
appropriates the applicant’s property rights, the Court will apply a stricter 
test to determine whether the conditions amount to a compensable taking.56 
The Court’s logic is that the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against 
uncompensated takings cannot be circumvented by a condition that 
expropriates land or money as part of a development application unless the 
nexus and rough proportionality tests from Nollan and Dolan are met.57  
The Court said that exaction cases:  
involve a special application of the “doctrine of 
‘unconstitutional conditions,”’ which provides that “the 
government may not require a person to give up a 
constitutional right—here the right to receive just 
compensation when property is taken for a public use—in 
exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the 
government where the benefit has little or no relationship to 
the property.”58  
Nollan and Dolan address the special context presented by exactions and 
hold that the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine prevents a land use board 
from doing indirectly what it cannot do directly.59 When evaluating 
                                                                                                                     
 54. See, e.g., Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 128–29. 
 55. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 n.8 (1994) (clarifying that the burden of 
proof is placed on the government). 
 56. See id. at 391. 
 57. See id. at 385–86, 398. 
 58. Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc, 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005) (quoting Dolan, 512 U.S. at 
385). 
 59. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (“Under the . . . doctrine of ‘unconstitutional conditions,’ the 
government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right—here the right to receive just 
compensation when property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit 
conferred by the government where the benefit has little or no relationship to the property.”); 
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (“In short, unless the permit condition 
serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid 
regulation of land use but ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion.’”); see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546 
(“[H]ad the government simply appropriated the easement in question, this would have been a per 
9
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exactions, the Court requires the government to show that any proposed60 
or imposed exaction (e.g., a condition) bears an “essential nexus”61 to the 
threatened harm and that the condition is “roughly proportionate” to the 
extent of the harm.62 Nollan and Dolan place the burden on government. 
When a landowner challenges a proposed or imposed condition, the 
government must prove that the nexus and rough proportionality 
requirements are satisfied.63  
In practice, the impact of this heightened exaction burden means that 
the government has a more favorable standard of review when denying 
noncompliant development applications than it does when offering or 
requiring conditions that bring the project into compliance.64 By placing a 
higher burden on land use boards that try to improve noncompliant 
applications, the Court is inadvertently discouraging negotiation of 
development projects. In order to lay a better foundation for understanding 
the impact of the Court’s rulings on government behavior in the following 
Parts, the remainder of this Part examines the nature of exactions and the 
Court’s treatment of them in Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz.  
The types of conditions discussed in this Article are commonly referred 
to as exactions.65 While this term is an imperfect label, its use is firmly 
established. “Exaction” implies that extortionate intent motivates the 
government’s desire to negotiate.66 The term has negative associations, but 
                                                                                                                     
se physical taking.”). But see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 1415, 1456–64 (1989) (explaining how the nexus requirement is used to address the Court’s 
inconsistent rulings on the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine and noting that cases such as 
Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932), hold that government can rightly condition any benefit 
it could deny, while Frost v. Railroad Commission of California, 271 U.S. 583 (1926), holds that 
government cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly). 
 60. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600 (2013).  
 61. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
 62. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (holding that “the city must make some sort of individualized 
determination” of the relationship between the condition and the threatened impacts).  
 63. Id.; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
 64. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 703 (1999) 
(concluding that Nollan–Dolan does not apply when the property owner challenges the denial of 
development). 
 65. See Been, supra note 12, at 478–83 (providing additional analysis of various forms of 
exactions); Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation: 
Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 181 (2006) (discussing the practice of 
requiring exactions as a land development condition imposed by local governments); Stewart E. 
Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1731, 1732 (1988) (defining an 
exaction as a single tax on land value). See generally ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSE A. GOMEZ-
IBANEZ, REGULATION FOR REVENUE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND USE EXACTIONS (1993) 
(evaluating the widespread use of exactions and the political, legal, equitable, and practical 
implications resulting from their use). 
 66. Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 
IOWA L. REV. 1, 14 & n. 61(2000) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 557 (6th ed. 1990) (defining 
“exaction” as “[t]he wrongful act of an officer or other person in compelling payment of a fee or 
10
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss1/4
2015] BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT POST-KOONTZ 181 
 
it is also not adequately specific. Municipalities use exaction as a catchall, 
referring to a wide range of government behaviors.67 At least one author 
has described exactions as “requirements that local governments impose as 
conditions to their grants of permission for a building or subdivision.”68 
Specifically, the types of conditions that landowners see as exactions 
include “mandatory dedications of land, fees required in lieu of dedication, 
and impact fees.”69  
1.  Physical Exactions 
Exactions may be physical in nature. Physical exactions can take the 
form of resource conservation easements, public access easements, or 
actual title transfers, among others. These forms of exactions are discussed 
in turn in the following Subsections. 
a.  Resource Conservation 
Land use boards can mitigate the impact that a development has on a 
community resource by requiring the dedication of a conservation 
easement on a portion of the property. The conservation easement will 
restrict the future use of the property to protect designated resources. For 
example, communities have used conservation easements extensively to 
preserve prime agricultural soils, scenic views, wildlife habitats, wetlands, 
and other valuable community resources.70 In Koontz, the landowner 
offered to place a conservation easement on 11 of the 14.9 acres of his 
parcel to protect the remaining wetlands and wildlife.71 
b.  Public Access 
Communities also use exactions to grant public access. Some boards 
may require an easement permitting the public some right to enter the 
applicant’s property. This right to access can be limited or unlimited. The 
                                                                                                                     
reward for his services, under color of his official authority, where no payment is due” and directing 
readers to also see the definition of “extortion”)) (explaining and arguing that “extortion” is a 
synonym for “exaction”). 
 67. See Been, supra note 12, at 478–83 (describing the history of exactions as an effort by 
municipalities to have developers fund the infrastructure improvements required for their 
developments). 
 68. Id. at 473 n.2. Of course, in light of Koontz, this definition should now read: 
“requirements that local governments propose and impose . . . .” 
 69. Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the 
Consequences of Clarity, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 609, 613 (2004) [hereinafter Fenster, Formalism and 
Regulatory Formulas]. 
 70. John R. Nolon, Managing Climate Change Through Biological Sequestration: Open 
Space Law Redux, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 195, 242–43 (2012) [hereinafter Nolon, Managing Climate 
Change]; see also Jessica Owley, Changing Property in a Changing World: A Call for the End of 
Perpetual Conservation Easements, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 121, 136 (2011). 
 71. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591–93 (2013). 
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California Coastal Commission imposed a limited right of access in Nollan 
when it required a lateral access easement allowing the public to traverse 
along the shoreline.72 This easement specifically prohibited public 
loitering, sunbathing, or similar activity.73 Under different circumstances, 
the government may request an easement granting the public more 
extensive rights of access.74  
c.  Fee Simple Transfer 
A board may also request that a landowner transfer complete ownership 
of a portion of the property to the municipality or some other entity. These 
requests may be for parks or other public purposes like roads, sidewalks, or 
other infrastructure requirements. In these instances, the landowner does 
not retain any ownership rights as if the board had only imposed a 
conservation easement on the property.  
2.  Monetary Exactions 
Exactions may also be monetary in nature. Monetary exactions can take 
the form of payments in lieu of physical dedication, impact fees, and off-
site mitigation measures, among others. These forms of exactions are 
discussed in turn in the following Subsections. 
a.  Payments in Lieu of a Physical Dedication 
Many boards require landowners to make payments in lieu of 
dedicating a property interest75 for a variety of reasons. Communities can 
use in-lieu payments to help protect resources that might not be located on 
the development site. For example, a town can create an acquisition fund to 
help the community protect a critical mass of land instead of disparate 
parcels. Developers can either dedicate land that has those designated 
resources or they can make a payment in lieu of a dedication into a 
municipal fund. Municipalities can use these acquisition funds to protect a 
wildlife corridor, an area of prime agricultural soils, or a scenic viewshed. 
Payments in lieu of dedications can also be voluntary, giving the 
                                                                                                                     
 72. Brief for Appellee, Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (No. 86-133), 
1987 WL 864769, at *4–5. 
 73. Id. at *8 n.3 (“No additional use is allowed, including loitering, sunbathing and the 
like.”). 
 74. E.g., Kaiser Dev. Co. v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 649 F. Supp. 926, 930 (D. Haw. 
1986), aff’d, 898 F.2d 112 (9th Cir. 1990), and aff’d, 913 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing an 
instance where the city requested dedication of the oceanfront as a public park). 
 75. Rosenberg, supra note 65, at 202–03 (“The ‘in-lieu of’ fee idea begins the practice of 
charging new development, in financial terms, for its contribution for off-site community facilities 
when the need for the new facility is related to the population occupying the new residential 
subdivision. . . . Today, these fees are commonly used to fund the acquisition and construction of 
off-site schools and park facilities and in some jurisdictions, street improvements, flood control, 
public resource access, and other public facilities.” (footnotes omitted)).  
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landowner the option to dedicate land or money.76  
b.  Impact Fees77 
Impact fees are generally defined as charges on new development 
designed to pay for off-site infrastructure expenses that a community will 
incur as a result of the development.78 Impact fees “could be imposed to 
provide for water treatment and supply, sewage collection and treatment, 
solid and/or hazardous waste treatment and storage, roads, bridges, mass 
transit, flood control, pollution control, schools, libraries, parks, open 
space and recreational facilities, sidewalks, affordable housing, and 
artwork.”79 It is not yet clear what types of impact fees trigger Nollan and 
Dolan scrutiny under Koontz.80 Lingle specified that heightened scrutiny 
only applies to adjudicative decisions and not legislative decisions.81 But 
Koontz imposes heightened scrutiny on monetary demands.82 This presents 
a problem for impact fees that governments adopt through legislative 
processes but administer through adjudicative processes.  
How will future courts treat these types of impact fees? Will courts 
grant the imposition of impact fees deference as legislative decisions or 
subject them to heightened scrutiny because some element of the fee was 
administered through an adjudicative decision? One can argue that only ad 
hoc monetary exactions like those the Supreme Court addressed in Koontz 
should be subject to heightened review. Still, some scholars have raised 
concerns that mandatory affordable housing requirements and school 
impact fees will not satisfy the rough proportionality requirement because 
municipalities do not administer most programs through an “individualized 
determination.”83 
                                                                                                                     
 76. However, some courts have held that payments in lieu of dedications must be based on 
findings “‘that a proper case exist[ed] for requiring that’ parkland be set aside or that a fee be 
imposed in lieu thereof.” E.g., Legacy at Fairways, LLC v. McAdoo, 906 N.Y.S.2d 668, 670 (App. 
Div. 2010) (alteration in original). 
 77. Vicki Been, U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev, Impact Fees and Housing 
Affordability, 8 CITYSCAPE 139, 141 (2005), http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/cityscpe/
vol8num1/ch4.pdf (noting the existing confusion between the use of the terms “exactions” and 
“impact fees,” and conceptualizing impact fees as a form of exaction for the purposes of her 
Article). 
 78. JAMES C. NICHOLAS ET AL., A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES 1 
(1991). 
 79. Rosenberg, supra note 65, at 205 n.100 (citing JAMES A. KUSHNER, SUBDIVISION LAW AND 
GROWTH MANAGEMENT § 6:31, at 1 (2d ed. 2005)). 
 80. See id. at 262 (arguing that while some states have imposed higher standards on all impact 
fees, the Court’s rulings have not produced a clear rule).  
 81. Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc, 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005). 
 82. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2603 (holding that 
monetary exactions are subject to Nollan and Dolan).  
 83. E.g., Patricia Salkin, U.S. Supreme Court Hands Down Koontz Case, LAW LAND (July 1, 
2013), http://lawoftheland.wordpress.com/2013/07/01/u-s-supreme-court-hands-down-koontz-case 
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c.  Mitigation Measures  
Beyond dedications of property and imposition of fees, boards may 
require applicants to engage in a broad array of activities that mitigate 
impacts of the development. When boards are concerned about the harmful 
effects of run-off from construction sites, they can require the developer to 
build siltation fences or other features that limit erosion.84 When boards are 
concerned about the effect of expensive residences on the affordability of 
housing in the community, they can require developers to build additional 
units of affordable housing.85 When boards are concerned about the impact 
of roads on endangered turtles, they can require developers to install 
slanted curbs that allow the animals to more easily cross roads that will 
fragment critical habitat.86 These mitigation measures require the developer 
to spend money associated with their ownership of property, suggesting 
that heightened scrutiny would apply under Koontz.  
Land use boards may require both on-site and off-site mitigation. If a 
development will impact traffic patterns, a board may require the developer 
to fund off-site traffic improvements. In Koontz, some of the District’s 
suggested mitigation measures included off-site improvements.87 Off-site 
mitigation measures obviously present a greater challenge when complying 
with the rough proportionality requirement. Boards must make an 
                                                                                                                     
(“Are legislated exactions, such as wetland banking, solid waste impact fees, or mandatory 
affordable housing requirements, that apply through some formula, subject to Koontz, or is the case 
limited to individual permit conditions aimed at a specific project’s impact such as those involved 
in Nollan and Dolan? If legislated and formulaic exaction systems are subject to Koontz, will the 
‘individualized determination’ requirement of Dolan, not mentioned by either the majority or 
dissent, be implicated? If so, how greatly will this affect area- or community-wide impact fees and 
other exactions?”). Compare David L. Callies et al., Land Development Conditions After Koontz v. 
St. Johns River Water Management District: Sic Semper Nexus and Proportionality, A.B.A. *15–
16 (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/state_local_government/
2013/08/Planning_materials.pdf (arguing that many “in lieu of payments” and affordable housing 
set aside requirements will fail Nollan–Dolan scrutiny), with Kevin D. Siegel, Inclusionary 
Housing Ordinance Developments, PUB. L. UPDATE (July 2013), http://www.bwslaw.com/tasks/
sites/bwslaw/assets/Image/July%202013%20Public%20Law%20Update1.pdf (arguing why Nollan–
Dolan should not be applied to recent California affordable housing cases decided by the Sixth 
Circuit). 
 84. See, e.g., Silt Fence Installation, CLINTON CNTY., MICH., http://www.clinton-
county.org/Departments/PlanningZoning/SoilErosionSedimentationControl/SiltFenceInstallation. 
aspx (last visited Nov. 27, 2014) (describing when siltation fences are required and when they 
should be used for protection against unnecessary siltation). 
 85. See David L. Callies, Mandatory Set-Asides as Land Development Conditions, 42–43 
URB. LAW. 307, 328 (2011). 
 86. See NICHOLAS A. MILLER & MICHAEL. W. KLEMENS, EASTERN WESTCHESTER BIOTIC 
CORRIDOR 21 (MCA Technical Paper No. 4, 2002), available at 
http://www.lewisborogov.com/sites/default/files/fileattachments/conservation_advisory_council/p 
age/4727/bioticcorridor.pdf. 
 87. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at *14–15; see, e.g., supra note 7 and 
accompanying text.  
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“individualized determination” to show that any off-site mitigation 
proposals will address the threatened harm and do so in a way that will 
satisfy a judge.88 
B.  Imposed Exactions Under Nollan and Dolan 
James and Marilyn Nollan leased a beachfront lot in Ventura County, 
California with a 504-square-foot house.89 They entered into a contract to 
buy the property conditioned on getting approval to demolish the house 
and replace it with a much larger one.90 Obtaining this approval required a 
permit from the California Coastal Commission—a state board authorized 
to protect the public’s access to the ocean.91 The Commission found that 
the new structure would diminish the public’s visual access to the ocean 
and impair the public’s willingness to access the beach.92 The Commission 
eventually approved the application on the condition that the Nollans 
dedicate a public easement along the shoreline to allow greater access to 
the beach.93 This approval was consistent with fourteen other teardowns in 
the same area.94 The Nollans then sued alleging that the imposed easement 
was a violation of their Fifth Amendment rights.95 
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a 5–4 majority, held that the 
imposed easement violated the Takings Clause because the condition did 
not bear an “essential nexus” to the impacts caused by the development 
and the Commission’s authority.96 Justice Scalia acknowledged the 
Commission’s rationale that the expansion of the house would reduce the 
public’s visual access to the beach and, consistent with the Commission’s 
report, that such an impediment would discourage the public from 
accessing the beach.97 Justice Scalia found, however, that the 
Commission’s remedy—a lateral beachfront easement—was not connected 
to the interest of preserving visual access.98 He indicated that an easement 
for a public viewing spot would have been a constitutional condition 
because, in his opinion, it was connected to the harm—reduced visual 
access which would lead to reduced physical access—that the Commission 
                                                                                                                     
 88. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). 
 89. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987).  
 90. Id. at 828. 
 91. Brief for Appellee, supra note 72, at *2–3. 
 92. Id. at *7–8.  
 93. Id. at *8.  
 94. See id. 
 95. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 829. 
 96. Id. at 837–39. 
 97. Id. at 838. 
 98. Id. (“It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on the 
public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans’ property reduces any obstacles to viewing the 
beach created by the new house.”). 
15
Nolon: Bargaining for Development Post-<i>Koontz</i>: How the Supreme Co
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
186 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
was trying to prevent.99 The decision in Nollan requires the government to 
show that any condition imposed on a development approval (to avoid 
harm from the development) is connected to a governmental purpose.100 
Without this “nexus,” such a condition becomes the “obtaining of an 
easement to serve some valid governmental purpose, but without payment 
of compensation.”101  
Seven years later, the Court added a second—and more demanding102—
criterion for evaluating exactions in Dolan.103 Florence and John Dolan 
asked the City of Tigard to approve their application to demolish their 
hardware store, replace it with another nearly twice the size, and install a 
paved parking lot for thirty-nine cars.104 The Dolan’s application did not 
comply with the city’s land use regulations and plans.105 The proposed 
additions were consistent with the city’s existing zoning but not with the 
city’s development regulations.106 These regulations contained provisions 
to protect against harms from storm drainage,107 reduce traffic 
congestion108 and protect open space.109 Specifically, the city’s Community 
Development Code required developments on property adjacent to the 
Fanno Creek and within its floodplain to dedicate land for a bicycle or 
pedestrian pathway and flood control protection.110 The city zoning 
ordinance also required developments of this type to dedicate at least 15% 
of the property to open space.111 The City Planning Commission approved 
the application on the condition that the Dolans dedicate a fifteen-foot strip 
of land for flood control and the pathway.112 The land dedicated for the 
bike path and flood control measures would require approximately 10% of 
the lot and the Dolans could count it toward the 15% open-space 
requirement.113 
Florence Dolan sued “on the ground that the city’s dedication 
requirements were not related to the proposed development, and, therefore, 
                                                                                                                     
 99. Id. at 836.  
 100. See id. at 837 (“[U]nless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as 
the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use . . . .”). 
 101. Id.  
 102. Compare Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (requiring an “individualized 
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the 
proposed development”), with Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (requiring the government to show a 
connection between the imposed condition and the original purpose of the restriction).  
 103. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.  
 104. Brief for Respondent, Dolan, 512 U.S. 374 (No. 93-518), 1994 WL 123754, at *1–2. 
 105. Id. at *4; see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 380. 
 106. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 104, at *2, *4.  
 107. Id. at *8–10.  
 108. Id. at *10–12.  
 109. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 380. 
 110. Id. at 379–80.  
 111. Id. at 380. 
 112. Id. at 379–80. 
 113. Id. at 380. 
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those requirements constituted an uncompensated taking of her property 
under the Fifth Amendment.”114 Eventually, the case made it to the 
Supreme Court where Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for another 
5–4 majority, decided the case “to resolve a question left open by [the] 
decision in Nollan . . . of what is the required degree of connection 
between the exactions imposed by the city and the projected impacts of the 
proposed development.”115 Because the Nollan Court found no connection 
between the imposed condition and a legitimate state interest, it did not 
address how related the condition must be to the state’s interest. Therefore, 
the Court used the facts presented in Dolan to formulate the requirement 
for “rough proportionality” between the condition and the threatened 
harm.116  
Similar to the nexus requirement in Nollan, the government has the 
burden of proving rough proportionality.117 When determining the 
proportionate relationship, the Court stated that “[n]o precise mathematical 
calculation is required, but the [land use board] must make some sort of 
individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in 
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”118 Applying 
this test to the facts of the case, Chief Justice Rehnquist ruled that the city 
failed to show the requisite rough proportionality because the traffic 
impacts were too speculative.119  
Eleven years after Dolan, the Court’s unanimous decision in Lingle 
reaffirmed the Nollan–Dolan analytical framework. Justice O’Connor 
reiterated:  
[Exaction cases] involve a special application of the “doctrine 
of ‘unconstitutional conditions,’” which provides that “the 
government may not require a person to give up a 
constitutional right—here the right to receive just 
compensation when property is taken for a public use—in 
exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the 
government where the benefit has little or no relationship to 
the property.”120  
Through Nollan, Dolan, and Lingle, the Court made it clear that 
demands for property imposed through adjudicative approvals trigger 
                                                                                                                     
 114. Id. at 382.  
 115. Id. at 375, 377. 
 116. Id. at 391. 
 117. See id.  
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 395 (“[T]he findings of fact that the bicycle pathway system ‘could offset some of 
the traffic demand’ is a far cry from a finding that the bicycle pathway system will, or is likely to, 
offset some of the traffic demand.” (citation omitted)). 
 120. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005) (quoting Dolan, 512 U.S. at 
385).  
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heightened scrutiny; however, the Court had not addressed whether 
conditions proposed in the approval process prior to a denial also triggered 
the same review.121 Stated differently, are the government’s actions subject 
to the “nexus” and “rough proportionality” requirements if it denies an 
application because the developer refuses to convey a property interest?122 
In 2013, the Court answered this question in the affirmative. 
C.  Proposed Exactions Under Koontz 
In 1972, Florida passed the Wetlands Restoration Act (WRA) to 
regulate “construction that connects to, draws water from, drains water 
into, or is placed in or across the waters in the state.”123 That same year 
Coy Koontz Sr. purchased a 14.9-acre parcel of land east of Orlando for 
roughly $95,000.124 Much of this parcel consisted of wetlands that would 
fall under the jurisdiction of the WRA.125 The parcel is located on the 
south side of Florida State Road 50 less than 1000 feet from its intersection 
with Florida State Road 408.126 A power line easement bisects this 
rectangular parcel of land into northern and southern portions.127 Later, 
Florida passed another wetlands law making it illegal to “dredge or fill in, 
on, or over surface waters” without a permit.128 In 1987, Florida paid 
Koontz $402,000 in compensation when they took 0.7 acres of the parcel 
through eminent domain to improve State Road 50.129  
In 1994, Koontz decided he wanted to develop the parcel and sought 
approval to build a shopping mall on 3.7 acres.130 He submitted an 
application to the District to fill 3.7 acres of wetlands on the northern 
                                                                                                                     
 121. See Mulvaney, supra note 29, at 293–99. The following cases have addressed the 
circumstance of proposed conditions prior to Koontz: Goss v. City of Little Rock, 151 F.3d 861 (8th 
Cir. 1998), William J. Jones Insurance Trust v. City of Fort Smith, 731 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Ark. 
1990), Lambert v. City and County of San Francisco, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562 (Ct. App. 1997), and St. 
Johns River Water Management District v. Koontz, 5 So. 3d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). See 
Mulvaney, supra note 29, at 293–99. 
 122. See Mulvaney, supra note 29, at 292–93. 
 123. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591–92 (2013 (quoting 
Water Resources Act, ch. 72–299, 1972 Fla. Laws 1115, 1116 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. 
§ 373.403(5) (2014)) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 124. Id. at 2591–92. John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 13 
(Vt. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 28-13, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2316406. 
(citing Proposed Final Judgment for Defendant at 45, Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (CI-94-5673)). 
 125. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592. 
 126. Id. at 2591–92. 
 127. Id. at 2592.  
 128. Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act of 1984, ch. 84–79, 1984 Fla. Laws 202, 
205 (repealed 1993). 
 129. Echeverria, supra note 124, at 13 (citing Orlando/Orange Cnty. Expressway Auth. v. 
Koontz, No. CI87-9182 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 24, 1989) (on file with author) (stipulating the final 
judgment)). 
 130. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592.  
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portion of his property.131 The development proposal included provisions 
to fill wetlands, level the parcel, and install a pond to collect storm water 
runoff from the developed land.132 In an attempt to comply with Florida’s 
wetlands laws, Koontz volunteered to place a conservation easement over 
the remaining approximately eleven acres of the property.133 This proposal 
did not, however, comply with the governing regulations for wetland 
development. District policy required developers to restrict at least ten 
acres of upland for every one acre of wetland destroyed.134 But, instead of 
denying the permit for not complying with relevant guidelines, District 
staff presented Koontz with several alternatives to mitigate the adverse 
impacts of his proposal.135 One suggestion involved reducing the proposed 
development to one acre.136 Another suggestion would allow Koontz to fill 
the 3.7 acres provided he improved wetlands at another location within the 
watershed.137 District staff presented several parcels where Koontz could 
provide off-site improvement such as fixing culverts.138 The estimated cost 
of these improvements was $10,000 but this was never confirmed.139 
Consistent with past practices, District staff informed Koontz that “it 
‘would also favorably consider’ alternatives to its suggested offsite 
mitigation projects if [applicant] proposed something ‘equivalent.’”140 
Koontz rejected all of these suggestions and refused to alter his 
application.141 District staff then offered additional time to keep 
negotiating so as to avoid denying the application.142 Koontz, through his 
lawyer, refused.143 On June 9, 1994, six months after receiving the 
application, the District denied the application because it did not comply 
with the existing regulations.144 
Koontz filed suit in Florida Circuit Court on the grounds that the 
District’s denial constituted a taking of his property.145 After several years 
                                                                                                                     
 131. See id.  
 132. Id. 
 133.  See id. at 2592–93. 
 134. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at *12. 
 135. Id. at *13.  
 136. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593. 
 137. Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at *14.   
 138. Id.; Final Order, No. F.O.R. 94-1498, supra note 5, at 1623, 1627.  
 139. Compare Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at *15 (stating the amount to be 
approximately $10,000), with ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MGMT. DIST., TRANSCRIPT OF REGULATORY 
MEETING 1662–63 (May 10, 1994) (indicating that costs were unknown). 
 140. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593 (quoting Appendix at 75). 
 141. Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at *15.   
 142. Id. 
 143. Id.; Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2611 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
 144. Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at *16; Final Order, In re Coy A. Koontz Mgmt. & 
Storage of Surface Water Permit Application No. 4-095-0474A, Case No. F.O.R. 94-1499, at 1621 
(St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. filed June 9, 1994); Final Order, No. F.O.R. 94-1498, supra 
note 5, at 1631. 
 145. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593. 
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litigating the issue of ripeness, the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.146 Justice Samuel Alito Jr., writing for a five-Justice majority, 
held “that the government’s demand for property from a land-use permit 
applicant must satisfy the requirements of Nollan and Dolan even when the 
government denies the permit and even when its demand is for money.”147 
Both the dissent and majority in Koontz agreed that a proposed demand 
prior to a denial could not be used to circumvent the Takings Clause.148 
Justice Elena Kagan, writing for the dissent stated: “The Nollan–Dolan 
standard applies not only when the government approves a development 
permit conditioned on the owner’s conveyance of a property interest (i.e., 
imposes a condition subsequent), but also when the government denies a 
permit until the owner meets the condition (i.e., imposes a condition 
precedent).”149  
However, the majority and dissent disagreed on whether the District’s 
actions in this case amounted to a demand triggering Nollan and Dolan. 
The majority chose not to disturb the determination of the Florida District 
Court of Appeal—relied upon by the Florida Supreme Court—that the 
government made a demand.150 But the decision left open the possibility 
that the issue could be revisited on remand.151 That the Court did not 
scrutinize the nature of the demand more thoroughly is troubling and Part 
III will discuss this issue in more depth.  
The dissent argued that the question was properly before the court152 
and used the record to explain why the District never made a demand of 
Koontz.153 Justice Kagan expressed concern regarding the majority’s 
unwillingness to clarify what constitutes a “demand” and feared that it 
                                                                                                                     
 146. See id. at 2594.  
 147. Id. at 2603. 
 148. Compare id. at 2591, with id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting). While the Justices agreed 
that both imposed and proposed demands trigger heightened scrutiny, the result muddies the water 
of takings law. The majority stated that proposed demands are not takings, rather they are 
“unconstitutional conditions.” Id. at 2597 (majority opinion). However, this conflicts with Lingle’s 
finding that exactions, like those involved in Nollan and Dolan, “involved Fifth Amendment 
takings challenges to adjudicative land-use exactions.” Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 
528, 546 (2005). Neither the majority nor the dissent offered advice on how to clear up this 
confusion. 
 149. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 150. Id. at 2598 (majority opinion) (citing St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 
So. 3d 1220, 1224 (Fla. 2011)). 
 151. Id. (“The Florida Supreme Court did not reach the question whether respondent issued a 
demand of sufficient concreteness to trigger the special protections of Nollan and 
Dolan. . . . Whether that characterization is correct is beyond the scope of the questions the Court 
agreed to take up for review. If preserved, the issue remains open on remand for the Florida 
Supreme Court to address.”).  
 152. See id. at 2604 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 153. Id. at 2610–11. 
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would lead to confusion.154 Specifically, she stated: 
Nollan and Dolan can operate only when the government 
makes a demand of the permit applicant; the decisions’ 
prerequisite, in other words, is a condition. Here, the District 
never made such a demand: It informed Koontz that his 
applications did not meet legal requirements; it offered 
suggestions for bringing those applications into compliance; 
and it solicited further proposals from Koontz to achieve the 
same end. That is not the stuff of which an unconstitutional 
condition is made.155  
This Article agrees with Justice Kagan’s concern and expresses the 
hope that future courts move quickly to clarify when a pre-decision 
proposal becomes a demand triggering Nollan–Dolan scrutiny. Until that 
time, land use boards must live with the current state of the law and 
exercise appropriate caution. The remainder of this Article explores the 
ruling’s impact on development application negotiations and provides a 
framework for land use boards negotiating in a post-Koontz world. 
D.  Exactions Post-Koontz 
The holding of Koontz expands the definition of an exaction. Now 
physical, monetary, imposed, and proposed conditions must meet the nexus 
and rough proportionality requirements.156 Exactly what this means for 
land use boards is unclear.157 These boards are likely to be confused about 
what types of suggestions and what types of monetary conditions are 
subject to Nollan and Dolan.158 For example, what form of impact fee 
qualifies for Nollan–Dolan scrutiny?159 What types of pre-decision 
suggestions will be seen as “proposed” demands under Koontz?160  
                                                                                                                     
 154. See id. at 2612. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. at 2603 (majority opinion). 
 157. Echeverria, supra note 124, at 40–41; see Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo M. Peñalver, 
Exactions Creep 2 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Coase–Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper 
No. 665, 2d series 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2345028. 
 158. See Echeverria, supra note 124, at 40–41, 46; cf. Mark Fenster, The Stubborn 
Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 525, 528–29 (2009) (discussing the 
ambiguity that has arisen from the “fuzzy factors” used in past Supreme Court decisions dealing 
with regulatory takings claims); Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 
CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 99–100 (2002) (discussing the vagueness of past Supreme Court takings 
jurisprudence). 
 159. Echeverria, supra note 124, at 49 (describing the confusion over how the various forms of 
monetary payments in land use processes can be distinguished from taxes). 
 160. See, e.g., Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596 (using “condition subsequent” for an imposed 
exaction and “condition precedent” for proposed exactions, and stating that the Supreme Court’s 
“unconstitutional conditions cases have long refused to attach significance to the distinction 
between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent”). 
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II.  NEGOTIATING DEVELOPMENT APPROVALS 
That negotiations play a central role in land use decision-making is well 
established.161 Many zoning techniques encourage a discussion of 
possibilities among municipalities and applicants.162 For a majority of 
Americans, the land use decision-making process offers the most direct 
access to government decision-making that they have.163 Professor Mark 
Fenster noted that “negotiated land use decisions are an essential aspect of 
contemporary local American governance, an excellent opportunity for 
individual stakeholders to seek political and social involvement in an 
accessible set of institutions, and an integral aspect of the creation of a 
functional local public economy.”164 There are over 35,000 government 
entities that have some form of land use control.165 Because the barriers to 
participation are very low, many citizens can be directly involved in these 
local decision-making processes.  
Municipalities can use a range of deliberative processes—including 
negotiation—to involve citizens in the legislative decision-making context 
while making legislative decisions, when adopting a comprehensive plan, 
zoning regulations, as well as during adjudicative decisions like 
development approvals.166 Citizens can participate in development 
                                                                                                                     
 161. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Structure of the Land Use Regulatory System in the 
United States, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 441, 457, 460–473 (2007); Alejandro Esteban 
Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, 
Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions: Installment One, 24 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 3, 4 & n.3 (2005) [hereinafter Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: Installment 
One] (citing Ryan, supra note 20, at 347–48 (“[M]ost agree that today, the raw material of most 
land use planning is the process of negotiation.”)); Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the 
Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and 
Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions: Installment Two, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269, 318–20 
(2005) [hereinafter Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: Installment Two]; Carol M. Rose, New 
Models for Local Land Use Decisions, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1155, 1168–70 (1985) [hereinafter Rose, 
New Models] (describing the prevalence of negotiation in land use decisions and the pros and cons 
of mediation as a process option); Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls 
as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 882–93 (1983) [hereinafter Rose, 
Planning and Dealing] (commenting on the prevalence of negotiated land use decisions but also 
pointing out the problems that “piecemeal” decisions present for the integrity of the land use 
system); see Merson v. McNally, 688 N.E.2d 479, 486 (N.Y. 1997) (noting that an open and 
inclusive negotiation process plays a legitimate role in land use decision making). 
 162. See, e.g., JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 25, at 262–63 (providing examples of 
zoning techniques that encourage discussion amongst municipalities and applicants). 
 163. See, e.g., Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: Installment One, supra note 161, at 
15–16. 
 164. Fenster, Formalism and Regulatory Formulas, supra note 69, at 671.  
 165. CARMA HOGUE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2012 GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION SUMMARY 
REPORT: GOVERNMENTS DIVISION BRIEFS 1 (2013), http://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/g12_org.pdf. 
 166. See, e.g., Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: Installment One, supra note 161, at 
15–16 (describing the role of collaborative governance in zoning decisions); Archon Fung, 
Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66 (2006) (describing how 
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applications through public hearings in ways that acknowledge their right 
to be heard.167 They can play a central role by setting the agenda for and 
leading ad hoc community meetings that amplify their role in the 
development decision.168 Additionally, since many significant development 
decisions involve multiple parties and raise many concerns not addressed 
by local laws, negotiation is often a more appropriate process than the 
more rigid required process.169 
A.  The Legal Framework for Development Negotiations 
While negotiating has become an integral part of land use decision-
making, these interactions always take place in the context of a defined 
legal framework170 established by the states to regulate land use under their 
general police power.171 Most state legislatures have delegated this 
authority to local governments through some form of enabling 
legislation.172 Therefore, to exercise this authority, municipalities generally 
develop comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances, and land use 
regulations.173 To administer these local regulations, municipalities then 
create agencies such as planning boards, appeal boards, and planning 
                                                                                                                     
different forms of citizen participation can be used for different types of decisions). But see David 
L. Markell & Tom R. Tyler, Using Empirical Research to Design Government Citizen Participation 
Processes: A Case Study of Citizens’ Roles in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, 57 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2008) (discussing concerns about citizen empowerment (citing JERRY L. 
MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 23–24, 29 (1985))); Jim Rossi, Participation 
Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. 
REV. 173, 177 (1997) (“[P]olitical theorists have often suggested that mass participation is not 
always a positive good for democracy.”). 
 167. Cf. David L. Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspectives on Government Decision 
Making Processes as a Way to Improve the Administrative State, 36 ENVTL. L. 651, 655 (2006) 
(“Processes that citizens value are likely to be processes that citizens use and that enhance citizen 
confidence in government, while processes with features that citizens find unsatisfactory are likely 
to be processes that do not engender meaningful citizen input . . . .”). 
 168. See Jaime Alison Lee, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: Making Participatory Governance 
Work for the Poor, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 405, 409 (2013) (“Inclusive, decentralized processes 
reflect the idea that all stakeholders affected by a problem should be engaged in the process of 
solving it.”). See generally Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, 
and Selves, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 503 (2008) (weaving together common themes in negotiation 
literature and new governance literature). 
 169. See Sean F. Nolon, The Lawyer as Process Advocate: Encouraging Collaborative 
Approaches to Controversial Development Decisions, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 108–12 (2010) 
[hereinafter Nolon, The Lawyer as Process Advocate]. 
 170. See Stewart E. Sterk, Structural Obstacles to Settlement of Land Use Disputes, 91 B.U. L. 
REV. 227, 229–30 (2011) (describing the unique circumstances that must be considered when 
negotiating settlements of land use disputes). 
 171. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 25, § 3.5. 
 172. Id. § 3.6.  
 173. See generally JOHN R. NOLON, WELL GROUNDED: USING LOCAL LAND USE AUTHORITY TO 
ACHIEVE SMART GROWTH 44–71(2001) [hereinafter NOLON, WELL GROUNDED] (discussing devices 
employed by municipalities in exercising land use authority). 
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departments.174 These entities may also hire planning consultants, 
engineers, enforcement officers, and lawyers to carry out their land use 
obligations.  
If a landowner would like to develop a significant project on her 
property, she will probably need a host of approvals from the local, 
regional, and possibly state governments.175 In theory, if the development 
application is consistent with governing laws, the land use board will 
approve the project. If, however, the application does not comply, the 
board can deny the application.176 When faced with a noncompliant 
application, a board may also suggest conditions to bring the project into 
compliance before issuing a denial.177 These suggestions serve as the 
foundation for many land use negotiations. 
Because land use boards are constrained in their ability to approve or 
deny development applications based on the suite of enabling laws and 
judicial rulings controlling their conduct, their negotiation suggestions 
must be consistent with their authority.178 For example, a board can only 
deny a project because it destroys a wetland if the state has granted the 
board the authority to protect wetlands in the first place.179 Imposing 
conditions that go beyond the scope of a board’s authority may invalidate 
the board’s decision.180 This nexus requirement, as just described, from 
Nollan is an effort to identify regulatory requirements that amount to an 
uncompensated taking.181 Boards must negotiate within the confines of the 
authorities delegated to them.  
Despite the delegated nature of their authority, many land use boards 
still have considerable discretion.182 In many states, municipalities have 
granted local boards significant flexibility when approving development 
                                                                                                                     
 174. Id. at 95.  
 175. See Nolon, The Lawyer as Process Advocate, supra note 169, at 108–12 (describing the 
unique nature of significant land use decisions); cf. MIKE MILES ET AL., REAL ESTATE 
DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PROCESS 307–14 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing overregulation as a 
major contributor to high land and housing development costs).  
 176. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013) 
(“Insisting that landowners internalize the negative externalities of their conduct is a hallmark of 
responsible land-use policy, and we have long sustained such regulations against constitutional 
attack.”). 
 177. See Fennell, supra note 66, at 3. 
 178. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 25, § 3.7. 
 179. See John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local Environmental Law, 
26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 377–78 (2002) [hereinafter Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism]. 
 180. See generally Frona M. Powell, Challenging Authority for Municipal Subdivision 
Exactions: The Ultra Vires Attack, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 635, 637, 640–41, 645 (1990). 
 181. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (“The evident constitutional 
propriety disappears, however, if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further 
the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition.”). 
 182. See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (2013) 
(“[T]he government often has broad discretion to deny a permit.”). 
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applications.183 For example, a landowner seeking to develop residential 
housing on a large parcel will need approval to subdivide one parcel of 
land into many individual parcels.184 How many parcels and their 
configuration will depend on site conditions as well as the relevant state 
laws, comprehensive plan, local zoning ordinances, subdivision 
regulations, other land use regulations, and any rules adopted by the 
approval board.185 The land use boards charged with making these 
decisions will apply these laws to the physical features of the parcel and 
take into account adjacent land uses.186 In these approval situations, the 
board will have considerable flexibility in determining how many lots the 
parcel can support and how the lots will be arranged.187  
To illustrate, assume that a landowner has one hundred acres in a 
district zoned for two-acre residential development. Strict arithmetic 
suggests that she could subdivide the parcel into fifty individual lots; 
however, after considering the governing laws and physical constrains, the 
calculation becomes more complicated. The lot count may be reduced after 
removing land for roads, infrastructure—such as electricity and water—
and physical limitations—such as steep slopes, rock outcroppings, 
wetlands, and other protected habitats.188 The board may increase the lot 
count if it has an incentive ordinance and the landowner agrees to provide 
the stated benefit.189 Through this combination of laws and site conditions, 
boards have considerable flexibility in deciding what shape a subdivision 
will take.190 Similar discretion exists in a host of other contexts such as site 
plan approval, wetland permits, special use permits, and environmental 
review.191 This discretion is what creates ample opportunity for developers 
to negotiate with land use boards and vice versa.  
As indicated above, local land use laws are not only restrictive. A host 
of tools are available that allow developers to increase their development 
potential. Many states grant boards the flexibility to encourage 
development192 that is consistent with the community’s comprehensive 
                                                                                                                     
 183. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism, supra note 179, at 378–86.  
 184. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 25, § 7.6. 
 185. See generally id. §§ 7.1–7.22 (providing an in-depth discussion of subdivision and 
planned unit development control law).  
 186. See id. § 7.6. 
 187. See id. 
 188. See id. §§ 7.9–7.16 (discussing conservation subdivisions, exactions on subdivision 
approval, and mapping for future streets and other public improvements).  
 189. Id. § 4.18. 
 190. See id. §§ 7.1, 7.6. 
 191. See Fennell, supra note 66, at 17, 25. 
 192. See, e.g., Jason McCann, Pushing Growth Share: Can Inclusionary Zoning Fix What Is 
Broken with New Jersey’s Mount Laurel Doctrine?, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 191, 204 n.92 (2006) 
(“Where zoning districts identify and prohibit certain uses, inclusionary zoning only encourages a 
particular type of construction: lower income housing.”); see also Jennie C. Nolon & John R. 
Nolon, Land Use for Economic Development in Tough Financial Times, 40 REAL EST. L.J. 233, 
25
Nolon: Bargaining for Development Post-<i>Koontz</i>: How the Supreme Co
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
196 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
plan of development.193 A local wetlands law may reduce the lot count, 
while an incentive zone may permit the clustering of smaller lots to 
increase the density of a development.194 Floating zones permit owners of 
qualified land to build more intensive developments than the underlying 
zoning would otherwise allow.195 
B.  Supplementing the Required Decision-Making Process  
When making these development decisions, boards must follow 
procedures enumerated in local, state, and federal law. These procedures 
often require an adjudicative format196 designed to protect both individual 
and communal property rights.197 These adjudicative processes have 
specific timelines, requirements for exchange of information, and public 
hearing requirements. As a result, the required decision-making process is 
trial-like;198 placing the board as the locus for information exchange and 
decision-making. A typical application goes through four stages: (1) the 
developer submits an application to the board; (2) the developer notifies 
adjacent property owners of the proposal and of the opportunity to 
                                                                                                                     
237–39 (2011) (“Many states use enabling legislation or administrative rules to authorize, 
encourage, or specifically require that economic development plans be included in a local 
comprehensive plan and coordinated with land use planning strategies.”). 
 193. Charles M. Haar, “In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan,” 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 
1154–55 (1955); Stuart Meck, The Legislative Requirement That Zoning and Land Use Controls Be 
Consistent with an Independently Adopted Local Comprehensive Plan: A Model Statute, 3 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 295, 295 (2000). 
 194. See Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? Comments on 
the Municipal Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 3 (1991) 
(“Through the land use regulatory technique formally known as ‘incentive zoning,’ cities grant 
private real estate developers the legal right to disregard zoning restrictions in return for their 
voluntary agreement to provide urban design features such as plazas, atriums, and parks, and social 
facilities and services such as affordable housing, day care centers, and job training.”). 
 195. Daniel P. Selmi, The Contract Transformation in Land Use Regulation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
591, 601 (2011) (citing 3 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND 
PLANNING § 45:1 (4th ed. 2010) (“Unlike traditional zoning by mapped districts, a floating zone 
establishes a use classification in the zoning ordinance when adopted by a legislative body but the 
classification is not delineated on the zoning map until after a rezoning process initiated by a 
property owner.”)). 
 196. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-
Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 638 (1976) (“Adjudication is conventionally 
perceived as a norm-bound process centered on the establishment of facts and the determination and 
application of principles, rules, and precedents.”); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of 
Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 368 (1978) (“The proper province of adjudication is to make 
an authoritative determination of questions raised by claims of right and accusations of guilt.”). 
 197. See NOLON, WELL GROUNDED, supra note 173, at 95–96. 
 198. See R. Lisle Baker, Exploring How Municipal Boards Can Settle Appeals of Their Land 
Use Decisions Within the Framework of the Massachusetts Open Meeting Law, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 455, 455–56 (2011); see also Naved Sheikh, Community Benefits Agreements: Can Private 
Contracts Replace Public Responsibility?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 226 (2008); Sterk, 
supra note 170, at 228–29. 
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comment on the proposal; (3) the board holds public hearings; (4) the 
board reviews the application in light of the comments and makes a 
decision.199 Most applications move through the process without delay; 
however, decisions that will have a significant impact beyond adjacent 
parcels often take more time to move through the required process.200 
While adjudicative processes minimize the likelihood of violating 
legally recognized rights, they are not well suited for more significant 
decisions that resist a narrow focus.201 As demonstrated by the subdivision 
example above, significant development decisions involve many issues, 
implicate many parties, and raise many concerns that cannot be addressed 
in a rights-based adjudication. Relying on adjudicative processes to 
administer this type of a decision creates problems.202 Without clear 
standards for decision-making, the adjudicator will have difficulty 
justifying one outcome over another in a way that satisfies the multiple 
parties involved. Scholars have long recognized that consensual processes 
such as negotiation offer advantages in development application.203 
Negotiation offers developers, boards, and residents opportunities to find 
mutually satisfying alternatives beyond the narrow scope of the required 
decision-making process.204  
When determining the reasonableness of development conditions—both 
limitations and bonuses—parties need to share information. Landowners 
                                                                                                                     
 199. See SEAN F. NOLON ET AL., LAND IN CONFLICT: MANAGING AND RESOLVING LAND USE 
DISPUTES 7 (2013); Baker, supra note 198, at 457–59. 
 200. See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495, 520–21 
(1994) (discussing effects caused by local opposition to undesired facilities); Markell & Tyler, 
supra note 166, at 3–8 (discussing the issue of “procedural acceptability” in the context of “hotly 
contested” questions such as public decisions with environmental implications); Nolon, The Lawyer 
as Process Advocate, supra note 169, at 112–15 (“In routine land development matters, this 
adversarial dynamic does not interfere with good decision-making; in significant land development 
matters, it presents a considerable obstacle.”). 
 201. See Fuller, supra note 196, at 394 (“The more fundamental point is that the forms of 
adjudication cannot encompass and take into account the complex repercussions that may result 
from [a polycentric task].”); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: 
The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 793 (1984) [hereinafter Menkel-
Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation] (arguing that an adversarial mindset will 
result in a narrow set of solutions). But see Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 161, at 887–93 
(describing how mediation can be used as an alternative process to supplement the required process 
for piecemeal changes). 
 202. See Fuller, supra note 196, at 394–95.  
 203. E.g., Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: Installment Two, supra note 161, at 270–
71; Fenster, Formalism and Regulatory Formulas, supra note 69, at 671; John R. Nolon, 
Champions of Change: Reinventing Democracy Through Land Law Reform, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1, 32 (2006); Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 161, at 887–93; Ryan, supra note 20, at 
338; Sterk, supra note 170, at 229–30.  
 204. See, e.g., LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFERY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: 
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 140–44 (1987) (describing how 
negotiation supplements the required decision-making process but does not substitute for it). 
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need to share information about the conditions of the site. Boards need to 
share information about their limitations and what authority they have to 
protect and improve community resources. Community members need to 
share information about their concerns. Unfortunately, the adjudicative 
nature of the required decision-making process inhibits the flow of 
information among the parties. First, parties need to direct communication 
to the board as the ultimate decision maker.205 Second, the process 
encourages misinformation and withholding of information as a way to 
make the other side look worse in front of the decision maker.206 Third, 
adversarial processes discourage creative problem solving by placing the 
interaction in an oppositional frame.207 Negotiation, on the other hand, 
allows parties to share the necessary information more freely to accurately 
determine what conditions are most appropriate. Negotiation offers a more 
efficient process when property owners are interested in engaging the 
community to determine the right type of project given the characteristics 
of the site and the needs of the community.  
The liberal exchange of information in negotiation allows parties to 
create value beyond the narrow outcomes possible through the required 
process.208 Land use laws define the rights landowners have to develop and 
authorize land use boards to implement and interpret those laws.209 Unlike 
other negotiation contexts where the legal shadow tightly constrains the 
parties,210 land use law casts a wide shadow within which parties can reach 
agreements.211 As illustrated by the subdivision application process, the 
law may give the parties a suite of options to consider. Instead of dividing 
a hundred-acre parcel into forty-five two-acre lots as allowed in that zone, 
an agricultural overlay ordinance may allow fifty-five lots if they are 
clustered onto twenty-five percent of the parcel away from prime 
agricultural soils. Similarly, affordable housing incentive zones may offer 
developers bonus units if they include some affordable units in their 
development. This result is often a more satisfying and appropriate use for 
both the landowner and the community because the landowner gets 
                                                                                                                     
 205. See NOLON, WELL GROUNDED, supra note 173, at 96–99. 
 206. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, 
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 21–22 (1996) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, The 
Trouble with the Adversary System]. 
 207. Gary Mendelsohn, Lawyers as Negotiators, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 139, 146 (1996).  
 208. See Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation, supra note 201, at 791 
(“The limited remedial imagination of courts . . . narrows not only what items might be distributed 
but also how those items might be apportioned.”). 
 209. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 66, at 18–20.  
 210. E.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951–53 (1979). 
 211. See Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 161, at 887–89; see also, e.g., Rosenberg, 
supra note 65, at 198–201 (discussing the wide legal framework surrounding subdivision regulation 
and development). 
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additional units for protecting an important community resource. Judicial 
decisions restricting this ability to bargain reduce that opportunity to create 
value. 
C.  Creating Value in Negotiation—The Potential for Gain 
There are several reasons why development decisions present 
opportunities to create value. First, many zoning mechanisms rely on 
negotiation to add value beyond the basic uses allowed by the zoning 
ordinance. Incentive zones, floating zones, planned unit developments, and 
developer agreements are a few examples of zoning instruments that rely 
on negotiation to create value for property owners and the community.212 
For example, incentive zones inform developers of resources the 
community needs and provide a list of development bonuses if those 
resources are provided.213 Whereas floating zones rely on negotiation to 
help parties identify the appropriate mix of community benefit to 
development bonus.214  
Second, development decisions are ripe for value creation because they 
present multiple issues.215 Disputes involving multiple issues allow parties 
to create value by taking advantage of differences in relative priorities 
among the parties.216 Development decisions often present many issues for 
negotiation including: the type of development allowed; the density of 
development; the impact on community infrastructure like sewage, 
drainage, traffic, and the number of parking spots required; the protection 
of environmental features; and provisions for affordable housing and 
                                                                                                                     
 212. See Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: Installment One, supra note 161, at 17–20, 
22 (describing floating zones, planned unit developments, and other land use mechanisms 
dependent on negotiation); see also Nestor M. Davidson, Values and Value Creation in Public-
Private Transactions, 94 IOWA L. REV. 937, 953–54 (2009) (describing how these “regulatory 
bargains are ubiquitous” in land use transactions).  
 213. Jerold S. Kayden, Market-Based Regulatory Approaches: A Comparative Discussion of 
Environmental and Land Use Techniques in the United States, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 565, 
568–74 (1992) (defining and discussing incentive zoning). 
 214. Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: Installment One, supra note 161, at 18. 
 215. Owen Oplin, Toward Jeffersonian Governance of the Public Lands, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
959, 962 (1994) (pointing out that “[m]ost important policy decisions on federal public land use 
and management do in fact involve multiple issues” that present opportunities for creative problem 
solving found in negotiation). 
 216. That multiple issues create opportunities to create value—expand the pie—is one of the 
central ideas behind modern negotiation theory. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING 
TO YES: NEGOTIATING AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 58–62, 67, 72, 78 (3d ed. 2011); DAVID 
A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 29–45 (1986); DEEPAK MALHORTA & 
MAX BAZERMAN, NEGOTIATION GENIUS 77–78 (2007); ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND 
WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 11–25 (2000); HOWARD RAIFFA 
ET AL., NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF NEGOTIATION 91, 206–07 (2002); Russell 
Korobkin, Against Integrative Bargaining, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1323, 1325–29 (2008); Gerald 
B. Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative Bargaining, 85 GEO. L.J. 369, 370 (1996).  
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parkland. Negotiation allows parties to create value by trading across 
issues, also known as “log rolling”,217 and adding new issues.218 Most 
developers recognize that negotiation presents opportunities that do not 
exist in the adjudicative approval process.219 A developer may be willing to 
add infrastructure needed by the community in exchange for increased 
density and a streamlined approval process.220  
Third, the presence of multiple parties in most significant development 
decisions also creates room for value creation. Multiple parties bring more 
resources to the table, which increases the options for reaching 
agreements.221 Negotiations can take place with community members 
directly or through government boards.222 Whether the parties will 
eventually reach an agreement depends on a host of factors such as the land 
use regime, market economics, the local culture, the personalities involved, 
their history of interactions, and the process used to conduct the 
negotiations. 
D.  Claiming Value in Negotiation—The Potential for Abuse 
The prevalence of bargaining in land use negotiations has also created 
problems. There is a long and unfortunate history of land use boards 
abusing their power in negotiations by overreaching and exploiting 
landowners.223 While one can attribute some of this behavior to hard 
                                                                                                                     
 217. MALHORTA & BAZERMAN, supra note 216, at 59–61 (describing the process of “log 
rolling”); see also, e.g., RAIFFA ET AL., supra note 216, at 459–60, 481–82 (providing specific 
illustrations of “log rolling” in political decision-making). 
 218. MALHORTA & BAZERMAN, supra note 216, at 62–65. 
 219. See Dwight H. Merriam, The Koontz Corner, ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., Dec. 2013, at 2, 5. 
 220. See Davidson, supra note 212, at 953 (“[A] private developer may enter into a 
community-benefits agreement in exchange for being able to build a project.”); Nolon, The Lawyer 
as Process Advocate, supra note 169, at 128. 
 221. See Robert H. Mnookin, Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A Comparison of 
Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 12 (2003) (“There are five 
types of differences that are all potential sources of value creation: different resources; different 
relative valuations; different forecasts; different risk preferences; and different time preferences.”); 
see also LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 216, at 45 (“[A] negotiator can also create and claim value 
by . . . bringing in a new party.”). 
 222. See David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land Development 
Conditions and the Development Agreement Solution: Bargaining for Public Facilities After Nollan 
and Dolan, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663, 663 (2001); Steven P. Frank, Yes in My Backyard: 
Developers, Government and Communities Working Together Through Development Agreements 
and Community Benefit Agreements, 42 IND. L. REV. 227, 227 (2009); Selmi, supra note 195, at 
593. 
 223. See Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 161, at 848–49. See generally RICHARD F. 
BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND POLICIES (1966) (describing the practice 
of municipalities enacting low density zoning regimes to be in a stronger position to negotiate with 
developers); ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK 
(1974) (describing the role of land use boards and agencies in the redevelopment of New York, the 
lack of public involvement, and the harms caused to existing neighborhoods and residents). 
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bargaining, a portion has also been motivated by illegitimate intent.224 
Boards have used their bargaining authority to systematically exclude 
minorities, low-income residents, and locally unwanted land uses; to push 
harmful impacts on neighboring communities; and to extract illegitimate 
concessions from developers.225 
In response, state and federal governments have placed limits on 
municipal authority to regulate land use.226 Congress passed the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act in response to municipal 
exclusion of religious facilities and prisons.227 After several judicial 
decisions in the Mount Laurel cases,228 the New Jersey legislature adopted 
the Fair Housing Act of 1985 to curtail local governments’ ability to 
exclude affordable housing.229 Indeed, the government’s history of abusing 
its discretion may be one of the reasons why the term “exactions” has 
become part of the land use vernacular.230  
When used legitimately, land use boards can impose conditions to bring 
a deficient application into compliance. Because every development 
application presents benefits and harms, boards are responsible for 
balancing the two. A new commercial development may benefit the 
community by bringing more tax revenue and at the same time increase 
                                                                                                                     
 224. See Been, supra note 12, at 482–83 (identifying five purposes that have been found for 
imposing exactions, two of which are illegitimate).  
 225. See id. (discussing the municipal use of exactions to mitigate traffic congestion, noise, 
and environmental degradation; prevent development such as low-income and moderate-income 
housing; and take financial advantage of developers); see also Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable 
Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE 
L.J. 1383, 1384 (1994) (arguing that “people of color and the poor are exposed to greater 
environmental risks than are whites and wealthier individuals” through zoning control of locally 
undesirable land uses). 
 226. Paul A. Diller & Samantha Graff, Regulating Food Retail for Obesity Prevention: How 
Far Can Cities Go?, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89, 89–90 (2011) (describing how the delegation of 
police power authority from states to local governments places limits on municipal authority); see 
also John R. Nolon, The Erosion of Home Rule Through the Emergence of State-Interests in Land 
Use Control, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 497, 517–24 (1993) (explaining states’ efforts to restrict the 
historical delegation of land use authority to municipalities). 
 227. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 
114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006)). 
 228. S. Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975); S. 
Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983). 
 229. See John M. Payne, Norman Williams, Exclusionary Zoning, and the Mount Laurel 
Doctrine: Making the Theory Fit the Facts, 20 VT. L. REV. 665, 666 (1996). 
 230. Fennell, supra note 66, at 14–15 (describing the history of how “exaction” has been 
used). Of course, there are many other plausible reasons why the use of “exactions” persists. The 
fact that courts commonly choose to use the term may be one. Another reason may be an intentional 
effort of libertarian scholars to capitalize on linguistic associations that degrade the underlying 
notion that zoning is a legitimate governmental purpose. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T 
THINK OF AN ELEPHANT: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE (2004) (describing 
conservatives’ coordinated efforts to use specific phrases and terms to frame policy issues).  
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vehicular traffic requiring a new stoplight and turning lanes. Land use 
boards structuring approval processes to maximize benefits and minimize 
harms in such a manner will produce the most efficient outcomes.231 
However, trial-like processes—like those of the required adjudicative 
approval process—are not well suited to identify appropriate exactions. 
Identifying appropriate exactions requires a free flow of information. Since 
adjudicative processes are notoriously poor at promoting information 
sharing among multiple parties,232 negotiation is the more efficient process 
option for determining appropriate exactions.233 
III.  BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF KOONTZ 
Negotiations take place in the context of alternatives. Whether a bargain 
can be reached depends on the parties agreeing to a deal that improves their 
no-agreement alternatives. The most common alternative in dispute 
settlement negotiations234 is to adjudicate the legal issues with the help of a 
court or administrative body.235 Divorcing couples negotiate the terms of 
their agreement in the shadow of the legal regime that courts will impose 
on them if an agreement is not reached.236 Similarly, developers and land 
use boards negotiate the terms of development proposals in the shadows 
cast by the many laws and regulations governing land use.237 This 
“bargaining in the shadow of the law” takes place in many negotiations and 
                                                                                                                     
 231. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 358 
(1995); see also Stewart E. Sterk & Kimberly J. Brunelle, Zoning Finality: Reconceptualizing Res 
Judicata Doctrine in Land Use Cases, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1139, 1142–43 (2011) (describing benefits 
that may be obtained for communities through the land use approval process). 
 232. See supra Section II.B.  
 233. See Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System, supra note 206, at 6, 34; 
see also Fuller, supra note 196, at 404 (“The court gets into difficulty, not when it lays down rules 
about contracting, but when it attempts to write contracts.”). But cf. Jeffrey R. Seul, Settling 
Significant Cases, 79 WASH. L. REV. 881, 896–900 (2004) (arguing that by sending conflicts to 
litigation, parties are delegating their authority to negotiate a solution to the judges). 
 234. Frank E. A. Sander & Jeffrey Z. Rubin, The Janus Quality of Negotiation: Dealmaking 
and Dispute Settlement, 4 NEGOT. J. 109, 109–10, 112 (1988) (discussing the distinction between 
different forms of settlement). 
 235. But see Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation, supra note 201, at 
796–97 (arguing that while most disputes involve some legal issues, there are often more issues in 
the negotiation that cannot be resolved by relying on legal norms).  
 236. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 210, at 968–69 (describing how divorce 
negotiations take place in the context of legal endowments and against the backdrop of judicial 
uncertainty). 
 237. See Sterk, supra note 170, at 229 (describing the considerations of municipal boards 
when settling land use disputes); cf. David Markell et al., What Has Love Got to Do with It?: 
Sentimental Attachments and Legal Decision-Making, 57 VILL. L. REV. 209, 241 (2012) (exploring 
how parties’ perceptions affect their attraction to different processes and noting that “while judicial 
litigation fares well when monetary values predominate, it does not fare well in protecting 
sentimental values”). 
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the shadow cast by the law has a direct influence on the way that parties 
order their behavior.238  
A.  The Shadow Cast 
A key question after Koontz is how the shadow of the heightened 
review for proposed conditions will change the behavior of land use 
boards. Will it cause municipalities to favor the absolutism of denials over 
the flexibility of deliberative negotiation? Justice Kagan makes a strong 
argument that governments “might desist altogether from communicating 
with applicants.”239 She offers this plausible hypothetical: 
Consider the matter from the standpoint of the District’s 
lawyer. The District, she learns, has found that Koontz’s 
permit applications do not satisfy legal requirements. It can 
deny the permits on that basis; or it can suggest ways for 
Koontz to bring his applications into compliance. If every 
suggestion could become the subject of a lawsuit under 
Nollan and Dolan, the lawyer can give but one 
recommendation: Deny the permits, without giving Koontz 
any advice—even if he asks for guidance.240 
A shift to absolutism was not an unforeseen possibility. Reinforcing the 
warnings in amicus briefs filed with the Florida Supreme Court,241 
Professor Fenster forecasted similar concerns: “Local governments, in turn, 
would become exceedingly wary about offering, or even discussing, 
conditions on development, thereby harming not only communities that 
would approve development without conditions, but also property owners 
who would face summary denials without the opportunity to bargain.”242 
Similarly, Professor Timothy Mulvaney opines: 
[I]f all permit application denials that followed some level of 
failed negotiations were subject to the Supreme Court’s 
exaction takings framework based on even one exaction 
                                                                                                                     
 238. See Jean R. Sternlight, Separate and Not Equal: Integrating Civil Procedure and ADR in 
Legal Academia, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 681, 697 (2005) (pointing out that many attorneys now 
litigate in the shadow of ADR). 
 239. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2610 (2013) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (“If a local government risked a lawsuit every time it made a suggestion to an applicant 
about how to meet permitting criteria, it would cease to do so . . . .”). 
 240. Id. at 2611. 
 241. E.g., Brief of Audubon as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant St. Johns River Water 
Mmgt. Dist. at 7, St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220 (Fla. 2012), rev’d, 
133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).  
 242. Fenster, Formalism and Regulatory Formulas, supra note 69, at 641–42; see also 
Fenster, Failing Exactions, supra note 25, at 643–44 (arguing that Nollan–Dolan scrutiny of 
proposed government demands to which landowner does not accede would unduly impede 
negotiations). 
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mentioned by the government during those negotiations, 
governmental officials would be forced into 
uncommunicative rejections or unconditioned approvals of 
development applications when a more amenable compromise 
may have been available.243  
In a recent article, Professor Ilya Somin agrees that Koontz diminishes 
the government’s ability to negotiate with developers244 and will lead land 
use boards to change their negotiation behavior.245 Others disagree, arguing 
instead that the decision will have little impact on the way land use boards 
negotiate with developers.246 Professor Steven Eagle notes:  
[L]ocal governments find conversations and bargaining with 
developers very useful and would be loath to give up the 
practice. If the price of continuing is to press demands that 
they actually are tailored to the applicant’s parcel and 
proportionate to the burden of development, the ensuing 
utility would seem to far outweigh the costs of possible legal 
challenges.247  
If the past is prologue, we can perhaps draw a lesson from a similar 
debate that occurred in the aftermath of Nollan and Dolan. Some scholars 
predicted that the enhanced requirements would have a chilling effect on 
the willingness of governments to impose conditions.248 Planners in the 
                                                                                                                     
 243. Mulvaney, supra note 29, at 307.  
 244. Ilya Somin, Two Steps Forward for the “Poor Relation” of Constitutional Law: Koontz, 
Arkansas Game & Fish, and the Future of the Takings Clause, 2012–2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 215, 
216. (“Koontz thereby limits the government’s ability to use permit processes and other land-use 
restrictions as leverage to force property owners to perform various services.”). 
 245. See id. at 230. (“In practice, however, governments can deal with the danger of lawsuits 
by restricting the demands they impose on landowners to those that are unlikely to violate the 
Takings Clause . . . .”). 
 246. E.g., Merriam, supra note 219, at 5; see also Callies et al., supra note 83, at 17–18 
(discussing the equally likely alternative of development agreements, which would allow local 
governments to require exactions prohibited by Koontz). 
 247. Steven J. Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion and the Gatehouse, 61 URB. LAW. (forthcoming 
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2354617. 
 248. Jonathan M. Davidson et al., “Where’s Dolan?”: Exactions Law in 1998, 30 URB. LAW. 
683, 697 (1998); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 183–84 (1993) 
(arguing that Dolan’s nexus “narrows the size of the bargaining range and hence reduces the state’s 
ability to extract concessions from individual owners”); Fennell, supra note 66, at 28–33 
(describing how the nexus and rough proportionality requirements retard bargaining for efficient 
outcomes); Robyn L. Sadler, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Takings Doctrine Remains Vague Under the 
Rough Proportionality Standard, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 147, 176–77 (1995) (arguing that the 
difficulty in appraising exaction fees for certain types of developments could discourage the 
projects entirely); Stewart Sterk, The Inevitable Failure of Nuisance-Based Theories of the Takings 
Clause: A Reply to Professor Claeys, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 231, 246 (2004) (“Nollan and Dolan have 
altered the takings landscape by reducing the leverage enjoyed by municipal officials in the 
planning process. Municipalities often seek concessions from developers as a condition to the 
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City of Tigard indicated that the decision steered them away from any 
actions that would be questionable.249 Other scholars argued that the fear 
was overstated.250 A study by Professors Ann Carlson and Daniel Pollak 
indicated that, at least in California, Nollan and Dolan did not end the 
practice of conditioning developments: “Contrary to initially negative 
reactions to the Court decisions, we found that an overwhelming 
percentage of California planners now view the Nollan and Dolan cases 
not as an encroachment upon their planning discretion but instead as 
establishing ‘good planning practices.’”251  
Koontz, however, is different. The shadow it casts over development 
negotiation is more complete than Nollan–Dolan and, therefore, more 
likely to leave a chill. The imposed nature of Nollan–Dolan conditions—
demands issued as part of an approval—presents a bright line for 
determining when a condition must have a nexus and be roughly 
proportionate. Koontz obscures that bright line with a thick fog by not 
clarifying what behavior will be subject to judicial review. Koontz requires 
that all demands made before a decision show a nexus and rough 
proportionality between the condition and public harm the condition seeks 
to minimize. While the opinion implies that demands should be definite, 
concrete, and specific, it does not offer any guidelines to make that 
determination.252 This lack of clarity leaves boards wondering when their 
suggestions will be considered demands by a reviewing court. 
Subjecting early-stage negotiation suggestions to the level of rigor 
necessary to show nexus and rough proportionality is problematic. Prudent 
boards are likely to retreat from direct involvement with developers and 
impose a more formal, ritualized development approval process because 
they cannot always be certain of whether their suggestions will be treated 
as demands that must satisfy the strict standard of Nollan and Dolan.253 
This lack of certainty over how suggestions, offers, or proposals in 
negotiations convert into demands triggering heightened scrutiny will have 
an effect on land use boards’ willingness to bargain.  
Prior to Koontz, boards could rely on the bright-line rule that only 
imposed exactions would be subject to heightened scrutiny under Nollan 
                                                                                                                     
issuance of development permits. . . . Nollan and Dolan have strengthened the hand of developers 
seeking to avoid these concessions.”).  
 249. Ryan, supra note 20, at 366–68 (explaining that “the planning process has become more 
formal but less creative”). Based on Koontz, negotiating the details of a development application 
would now be a risky behavior for some planners. 
 250. See, e.g., Carlson & Pollak, supra note 20, at 142 (reporting that a “large percentage of 
municipal planners view the Supreme Court takings precedents favorably”).  
 251. Id. at 105.  
 252. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2598 (2013).   
 253. See infra Section IV.A. 
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and Dolan.254 The Court removed that bright line in Koontz by holding that 
courts should treat proposed exactions the same as imposed exactions. 
While Justice Alito and Justice Kagan agreed that municipalities cannot 
use proposed demands to circumvent Fifth Amendment just compensation 
protections, they disagreed on whether the District made a “demand.”255 
The majority relied on the Florida District Court of Appeal’s determination 
that the District had issued a demand and declined to address the 
question.256  
The Florida Supreme Court did not reach the question 
whether respondent issued a demand of sufficient 
concreteness to trigger the special protections of Nollan and 
Dolan. It relied instead on the Florida District Court of 
Appeals’ characterization of respondent’s behavior as a 
demand for Nollan/Dolan purposes. Whether that 
characterization is correct is beyond the scope of the 
questions the Court agreed to take up for review. If preserved, 
the issue remains open on remand for the Florida Supreme 
Court to address. The Court therefore has no occasion to 
consider how concrete and specific a demand must be to give 
rise to liability under Nollan and Dolan.257 
Unfortunately, this characterization of the District’s behavior as a 
demand was little more than that. Judge Robert J. Pleus, in his opinion 
concurring with the Florida District Court of Appeal, made the conclusory 
determination that the District’s behavior amounted to a “demand” with 
little analysis of the issue.258 But the question before the Florida District 
Court of Appeal in 2003 was ripeness—specifically, whether the District 
could appeal an order by the Circuit Court ruling that the District’s action 
amounted “to an unreasonable exercise of its police power.”259 The Court 
of Appeal ruled that the District could not appeal the Circuit Court’s 
order.260 Judge Pleus concurred “specially” with an opinion that went 
                                                                                                                     
 254. See Mulvaney, supra note 29, at 290–95 (citing Goss v. City of Little Rock, 151 F.3d 861 
(8th Cir. 1998), William J. Jones Ins. Trust v. City of Fort Smith, 731 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Ark. 
1990), Lambert v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562 (Ct. App. 1997), and St. Johns River 
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 5 So. 3d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)) (arguing that only a few courts 
considered the question of proposed exactions prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Koontz). 
 255. See supra notes 147–55 and accompanying text.  
 256. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598 (implying that a demand should be “concrete” and “specific” 
but deciding not to use the extensive record to explain whether the District’s behavior met that 
requirement to guide future land use boards).  
 257. Id. (citation omitted).  
 258. See St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 861 So. 2d 1267, 1268–69 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2003) (Pleus, J., concurring), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).  
 259. See id. at 1268 (majority opinion).  
 260. Id.  
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beyond the ripeness question presented to the Court of Appeal.261 A review 
of Judge Pleus’s concurring opinion reveals the purpose of his opinion was 
“to describe the extortionate actions of St. Johns Water Management 
District . . . in this case as shown in the trial below.”262 Other than labeling 
the District’s behavior as a “demand,” Judge Pleus offers no rationale as to 
what turned the District’s suggestions into demands.  
At the Supreme Court, in her dissent, Justice Kagan disagreed that the 
issue was not properly before the Court and explored the question of 
whether the District had made a demand.263 Instead of relying on Judge 
Pleus’s dictum that labeled the behavior as a demand, Justice Kagan used 
the record—provided in the parties’ briefs—to explain why the District’s 
proposals never amounted to “a demand or set a condition.”264 “[T]he 
District suggested to Koontz several non-exclusive ways to make his 
applications conform to state law. The District’s only hard-and-fast 
requirement was that Koontz do something—anything—to satisfy the 
relevant permitting criteria.”265 In addition, the District’s suggestions were 
not definite, concrete, or specific,266 the costs of the District’s mitigation 
alternatives were not specified, and the transcript of the District’s hearing 
did not reveal a convincing case that a demand was made. According to the 
transcript, the District had not established the cost of the off-site mitigation 
or the cost of the one-acre alternative.267  
Because the majority offered no discernible test for what constitutes a 
demand, land use boards now have little direction about what negotiation 
behavior may subject them to the heightened standard of judicial review.268 
This lack of a definition makes it difficult for attorneys to advise municipal 
clients about what negotiation behavior courts will see as a demand that 
triggers heightened scrutiny. Therefore, it is very likely that attorneys will 
advise their municipal clients to be cautious and avoid making pre-
approval proposals before developers provide adequate information about 
the impacts of their projects. Anecdotal evidence suggests that attorneys 
are already providing such advice.269  
                                                                                                                     
 261. Id. at 1268–72 (Pleus, J., concurring). 
 262. Id. at 1268. 
 263. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2609–11 (2013) (Kagan, 
J., dissenting). 
 264. Id. at 2610–11. 
 265. Id. at 2611.  
 266. Id. at 2610–11. 
 267. ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MGMT. DIST., supra note 139, at 1662–67. 
 268. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594–95 (majority opinion) (concluding that land use boards 
must show that at least one condition, proposal, suggestion, offer or demand made in a negotiation 
passes the “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests).  
 269. E.g., Interview with Julie Tappendorf, Partner, Ancel Glink Diamond Bush DiCanni & 
Krafthefer (Feb. 11, 2014) (on file with author) (discussing her policy of advising municipal clients 
that they should assume all suggestions made prior to a decision must satisfy the Nollan–Dolan 
criteria). 
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Future courts have an opportunity to clarify what will be seen as a 
specific, concrete, and definite demand. Since Koontz extends the Nollan–
Dolan framework, that clarification should trench closely to the context 
within which the demands arose in those cases. Nollan and Dolan 
presented the Court with demands that were included in approved 
development projects—imposed conditions. The California Coastal 
Commission and the City of Tigard stated these demands with sufficient 
specificity to incorporate them into the technical engineering specifications 
of the development.270 Without doing so, the developer could not comply. 
A framework consistent with the context of Nollan and Dolan would 
require that a demand is “concrete” when the effect on the applicant is 
measurable. A demand is “definite” when the board has made a 
commitment that if the landowner incorporates the condition into the 
application, the board will approve the application. A demand is “specific” 
when the board describes the condition with sufficient detail to provide 
clarity from an engineering perspective. 
B.  Comparing Apples (Imposed Demands) to Oranges (Proposed 
Demands) 
Without a clear framework indicating what constitutes a demand, 
boards are left in a difficult position. If all suggestions must, prudently, 
show a nexus and rough proportionality, boards will be at a disadvantage in 
their negotiations. If they make suggestions without the requisite findings, 
courts will judge any subsequent denial under heightened scrutiny. In this 
sense, proposed demands are the apples to the oranges of imposed 
demands. Demands imposed through an approved permit are a very 
different beast than demands proposed prior to a denial. A post-decision 
demand is easy to identify. For example, when requiring conveyance of a 
public access easement in exchange for permission to build, the demand 
specifies an amount of land and identifies a specific purpose. Landowners 
must meet the specified conditions of approval to complete the 
development. Courts, landowners, and land use boards can measure the 
impact of a post-decision demand on the landowner and the community. 
They can also measure the impact of the condition on the property value; 
and, relevant to the Nollan–Dolan determination, the decision-making 
record of the required approval process provides a rationale for post-
decision demands.  
On the other hand, many proposed demands lack the adequate 
specificity described above. Land use boards often propose conditions, 
during the review process prior to a denial, without the benefit of a full 
record because the record is not yet complete. Boards cannot satisfy Nollan 
                                                                                                                     
 270. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 104, *10–12; Brief for Appellee, supra note 72, at 
*7–8. 
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and Dolan without adequate information about what the impacts of a 
development will be. That information is usually not available early in the 
approval process because most developers do not provide it until later 
stages.  
In imposed-condition cases—like Nollan and Dolan—the condition is a 
by-product of a thorough and rigorous review process.271 In most states, 
that review process includes extensive opportunity to exchange 
information as part of the formal review procedure. This process often 
takes weeks or months and involves gathering and processing information 
from engineers, biologists, hydrologists, and a host of other experts. The 
land use board, with help from their attorneys, must evaluate this 
information along with information submitted by the public before 
approving or denying the development.272 As a consequence of this 
significant deliberation, a condition incorporated into—imposed on—an 
approval is a product of a robust analysis with advice from many land use 
professionals. Post-Koontz, land use boards must wait until the record is 
sufficiently complete before they can make a proposal that they are sure 
satisfies Nollan and Dolan. 
For example, when the Nollan Court found that the condition imposing 
public access to the beach exhibited no “nexus” to the governmental 
purpose, the Court relied on an extensive record created by the California 
Coastal Commission.273 The Court used that record to hold that the 
Commission’s purpose in imposing the easement was to enhance the 
public’s visual access to the ocean.274 Justice Scalia used that record to find 
that a beachfront easement was not connected to enhancing visual access 
from the road.275 In Dolan, the Court found that a condition requiring a 
public easement was not roughly proportionate to the goal of traffic 
                                                                                                                     
 271.  See, e.g., Uniform Land Use Review Procedure, DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, N.Y.C., 
APPLICANT PORTAL, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/ap/step5_ulurp.shtml (last visited Nov. 27, 
2014). 
 272. See, e.g., id.  
 273. See supra text accompanying notes 91–97. 
 274. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 838–39 (1987) (finding that the California 
Coastal Commission was attempting to enhance visual access and not physical access). However, in 
reading the Commission’s brief, Justice Scalia seems to have missed an important point: the 
Commission stated that they were not just protecting visual access but physical access. The enlarged 
house would diminish visual access to the beach, the diminished visual access would lead to 
diminished physical access, and, therefore, the beachfront easement was an effort to remedy that 
condition by promoting physical access. Brief for Appellee, supra note 72, at *8 (arguing that the 
Nollan’s proposed house was “a visual impediment to public access” because “if the public cannot 
see the coast, the public is not inclined to use it”). Justice Scalia saw the Commission’s purpose as 
promoting visual access but not physical access; therefore, the condition was not connected. This 
type of judicial confusion (or intentional distortion?) will become more common in the wake of 
Koontz now that judges are obligated to subject proposed conditions to heightened scrutiny. 
 275. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838–40. But see id. at 850–51 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the trial record did show a nexus between the condition and the Commission’s authority).  
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reduction because it was based on the rationale that it “could” reduce 
traffic not “would” or even “was likely to.”276 The Court used the extensive 
record created in the development approval process to evaluate the 
condition and make the necessary determination of rough 
proportionality.277 In addition, many development projects present a range 
of interrelated issues. Adjusting one attribute of the project may require 
similar adjustments to other components. How can a board ensure that 
every suggestion satisfies Dolan’s “individualized determination” 
requirement to show that any off-site mitigation proposals will address the 
threatened harm before the application process defines that threatened 
harm?  
Negotiation proposals may not have the benefit of a complete record 
when the parties generate them. Yet, post-Koontz, courts will evaluate 
those proposals in light of the now-complete record. If a board makes a 
suggestion early in the process and then denies the permit, that suggestion 
must satisfy Nollan and Dolan to avoid being an unconstitutional 
condition. This is particularly true of the rough proportionality prong that 
requires “some sort of individualized determination that the required 
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the proposed 
development’s impact.”278 The Dolan Court held that a condition that 
“could” mitigate harmful impacts is not sufficient to pass the “roughly 
proportionate” test.279 Instead, only conditions that “will” or “are likely” to 
mitigate impacts are constitutional.280 The conditions that amounted to 
unconstitutional conditions in Nollan and Dolan were stated with 
specificity in the final decision after the full deliberation of the required 
process.281  
Post-Koontz, land use boards offering proposals in development 
processes should be wary of the standard to which they will be held if the 
developer appeals any subsequent denial. Proposals to improve 
noncompliant applications must be reasonably related to the governmental 
purpose, and boards must make an individualized determination to show 
                                                                                                                     
 276. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 395–96 (1994) (“No precise mathematical 
calculation is required, but the city must make some effort to quantify its findings in support of the 
dedication for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond the conclusory statement that it could offset 
some of the traffic demand generated.”). 
 277. Id. at 389–91.  
 278. Id. at 391. 
 279. See id. at 395–96. 
 280. Id. at 395. 
 281. Brief for Respondent, supra note 104, at *3 (stating that the condition in Dolan “required 
Petitioner to dedicate easements to allow the City to address flood hazards and traffic congestion, 
problems caused by the proposed development”); Brief for Appellee, supra note 72, at *8 (“At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the Commission approved the Nollan permit subject to recordation of a 
deed restriction acknowledging the right of the public to pass and repass across the narrow beach 
between the ocean and the toe of the Nollans’ seawall.”). 
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the requisite rough proportionality. Since the boards have the burden of 
proving these two elements,282 they will need to create a record supporting 
their proposals before any proposals are made to developers. This cuts off 
the options for negotiation at an early stage in the process and thus reduces 
the likelihood that an agreement will be reached.  
IV.  POST-KOONTZ OPTIONS FOR LAND USE BOARDS 
Fortunately, boards have several options in addition to choosing a strict 
diet of denials. When boards face a discretionary approval they can also 
chose to: hire a mediator who can facilitate negotiation among the 
stakeholders; negotiate without making offers; negotiate (despite the risks); 
or attempt to insulate their negotiation process through pre-approval 
processes and waiver. 
A.  Avoid Negotiation—Deny If Noncompliant and Approve If 
Compliant 
Land use boards need not negotiate. Since most land use boards are set 
up as adjudicative bodies, they are not naturally equipped to negotiate.283 
State and local laws define the required process that municipalities must 
follow and do not require boards to interact with applicants beyond those 
requirements. Boards receive the application, determine when the 
application is complete, ensure all time frames are met, give notice of the 
meetings, and provide an opportunity for public comment.284 Once the 
boards have satisfied the requirements of the process, they can either 
approve or deny the proposal based on the information submitted. If the 
board does not propose or impose conditions, Nollan and Dolan will not 
trigger heightened scrutiny. If the developer challenges the decision as a 
taking, the developer must show that the decision violated Penn Central. 
Justice Kagan noted this “avoid negotiation” option in her dissent in 
Koontz: “If every suggestion could become the subject of a lawsuit under 
Nollan and Dolan, the lawyer can give but one recommendation: Deny the 
permits, without giving [the developer] any advice—even if he asks for 
guidance.”285  
This option presents difficulties, however. For development decisions, 
where boards have the discretion to accept suggested improvements and 
make their own suggestions, not negotiating will seem artificial.286 
                                                                                                                     
 282. See supra text accompanying note 63.  
 283. Baker, supra note 198, at 455–56. 
 284. NOLON, WELL GROUNDED, supra note 173, at 95–100. 
 285. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2611 (2013) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting).  
 286. Cf. Eagle, supra note 247, at 31–32 (arguing that because negotiation is an informal 
process, fears about increasing municipal rigidity and absolutism are overstated); Merriam, supra 
note 219, at 5 (pointing out that developers will want to negotiate). 
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Municipalities adopt many ordinances that anticipate and encourage 
negotiation. In New York, some planning boards have the authority to 
require subdivision applicants to cluster the lots away from critical 
community resources.287 Courts may view requesting that the applicant 
cluster units as a demand that triggers heightened scrutiny. Not negotiating 
will take discipline. 
B.  Facilitate Negotiation Among Stakeholders 
Boards that decide not to negotiate can simultaneously encourage the 
developer to negotiate directly with community stakeholders.288 This 
negotiation could take place before or after the developer submits an 
application.289 If the developer and the stakeholders reach an agreement, 
the developer can integrate that agreement into the application and make it 
part of the board’s decision. If the developer chooses to integrate any of the 
conditions discussed in the negotiation, she does so voluntarily. Any 
conditions included will be part of the developer’s application and then be 
voted on by the board. This leaves open the option for negotiation but does 
not require the board to participate. By not participating, the board does not 
propose any conditions and the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan 
will not apply if the developer appeals a subsequent denial.  
Many boards have the discretion to promulgate rules outlining their 
decision-making procedures and can use that discretion to encourage pre-
application negotiations. In fact, there are many examples of these local 
ordinances.290 These rules typically provide an opportunity for developers 
to discuss their plans with neighbors prior to submitting a formal 
application. For example, the City of San Francisco requires pre-
application meetings between the developer and a prescribed group of 
neighbors for new construction, alterations, and formal retail uses.291 Other 
municipalities simply encourage negotiation with affected parties but do 
                                                                                                                     
 287. See NOLON, WELL GROUNDED, supra note 173, at 219–22.  
 288. E.g., Merson v. McNally, 688 N.E.2d 479, 486 (N.Y. 1997) (upholding the actions of a 
land use board that facilitated a stakeholder negotiation as part of a special permit application). 
 289. See, e.g., Nolon, The Lawyer as Process Advocate, supra note 169, at 117–21 
(documenting a case study where the developer submitted an as-of-right application while 
simultaneously negotiating with community stakeholders). 
 290. The Gaining Ground database of land use ordinances cites eleven examples of pre-
application and consensus building ordinances. Pre-Application & Consensus Building, GAINING 
GROUND INFO. DATABASE, http://www.landuse.law.pace.edu/SPT--BrowseResources.php?
ParentId=762 (last visited Nov. 27, 2014). 
 291. Section 311 Pre-Application Process, S.F. PLANNING DEP’T, http://www.sf-
planning.org/index.aspx?page=1575 (last visited Nov. 27, 2014) (“Pre-Application shall be 
required for certain alterations proposed in all RH and RM Districts. The intent of the process is to: 
(1) initiate neighbor communication to identify issues and concerns early on; (2) provide the project 
sponsor the opportunity to address neighbor concerns prior to submitting their building permit 
application; and (3) reduce the number of Discretionary Reviews (DRs) that would result in a public 
hearing before the Planning Commission.”). 
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not require it.292 Many municipalities also provide general information 
intended to make the approval process more satisfying to citizens and 
applicants.293 Highlighting the specific advantages of pre-application 
negotiation can increase the likelihood that developers and stakeholders do 
not miss the opportunity to identify mutually acceptable conditions early in 
the process.  
There may be barriers to this option. Some developers resist pre-
application processes fearing that boards will use the added procedure to 
delay an already lengthy and drawn-out process.294 In addition, citizens 
often fear that pre-application negotiations will limit a board’s authority 
later in the process.295 To allay these fears, local rules should state that any 
agreement is only advisory and boards must review an agreement through 
the required decision-making process. 
Mediators may provide support when these types of obstacles arise. 
When facing highly contentious decisions, a board can suggest that parties 
hire a mediator to manage the negotiations.296 Some ordinances make this 
                                                                                                                     
 292. See, e.g., Land Use Facilitation Program, CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, 
http://www.cabq.gov/legal/adr/luf (last visited Nov. 27, 2014); Pre-Application & Consensus 
Building for Borough of Red Bank, NJ, GAINING GROUND INFO. DATABASE, 
http://landuse.law.pace.edu/landuse/documents/laws/reg2/BoroughofRedBankNJ-Pre-App&Cons 
ensus.doc (last visited Nov. 27, 2014).  
 293. See, e.g., Dep’t of Regulatory & Econ. Res. Zoning Process Improvement Project, Pre-
Application Process, MIAMI-DADE COUNTY (June 2014), http://www.miamidade.gov/zoning
/library/guidelines/pre-application-process-summary.pdf; One Stop Shop, CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, 
http://www.nola.gov/onestop/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2014); see also “One Stop Shop” for Building 
Permits, NASHVILLE.GOV, http://www.nashville.gov/Codes-Administration/Construction-and-
Permits/One-Stop-Shop.aspx (last visited Nov. 27, 2014). 
 294. Cf. Brad Spangler, Decision-Making Delay, BEYOND INTRACTABILITY (July 2003), 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/delay (“Normally, disputants use delay to deliberately 
stall the decision making process.”). 
 295. Compare William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory 
Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L. J. 1351, 1375 (1997) (“[T]here is 
a subtle (and sometimes not so subtle) dynamic in the negotiation process that diminishes the 
sanctity of the law as both the source of agency authority and its limit.”), with Philip J. Harter, Fear 
of Commitment: An Affliction of Adolescents, 46 DUKE L.J. 1389, 1418–20 (1997) (describing how 
agency representatives have resisted implementing the results from collaborative processes), and 
Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 60 (2000) (providing evidence from studies that negotiated rulemaking offers 
efficiencies not possible in the required rule making process). 
 296. See Jeffrey H. Goldfien, Thou Shalt Love Thy Neighbor: RLUIPA and the Mediation of 
Religious Land Use Disputes, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 435, 462 (“[T]he highly contested nature of 
religious land use disputes may eventually encourage local officials to try mediation.”); Matthew 
McKinney et al., Commentary, Responding to Streams of Land Use Disputes, 60 PLAN. & ENVTL. 
L., Apr. 2008, at 3 (discussing two studies demonstrating that negotiation and mediation can resolve 
disputes over land use); John R. Nolon & Jessica A. Bacher, Changing Times—Changing Practice: 
New Roles for Lawyers in Resolving Complex Land Use and Environmental Disputes, 27 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 7, 36 & n.101 (2010) (identifying seven states that have statutes that acknowledge 
the importance of land use mediation); Rose, Planning and Dealing, supra note 161, at 887–93; cf. 
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option explicit. For example, in the Town of Amenia, New York, a local 
rule states the following: 
At any point in a project review process the Planning 
Board may, if it deems appropriate and the parties consent, 
appoint a mediator to work informally with the applicant, 
neighboring property owners, and other interested parties 
to address concerns raised about the proposed Special 
Permit use. Any party may request mediation.297 
Mediators can help by identifying the right parties to involve, building 
trust, improving communication, gathering relevant facts, identifying and 
evaluating alternatives, and drafting agreements.298 
One disadvantage of this option is that boards and their staff cannot 
participate in the negotiation. If they do, any of their suggestions may be 
subject to Nollan–Dolan scrutiny in a subsequent legal challenge. Many 
land use boards have valuable expertise that would be useful to the parties. 
Not having them at the table will decrease the efficiency of the negotiation. 
Municipalities may have to complete studies that duplicate the pre-
application process and the negotiators will not benefit from the board’s 
expertise regarding what has worked in the past. For example, the District 
in Koontz has a staff of experts who offer valuable information about the 
application, adjacent parcels, and regional resources.299  
Additionally, boards often conduct studies pursuant to their planning 
function. These studies can identify threats to the community clarifying 
what types of mitigation measures are appropriate. Boards also have 
technical staff with expertise to help the parties find suitable ways to 
reduce the impact of their development. If these staff are not part of any 
negotiation, their expertise is not available to the parties during their 
deliberations. If the parties reach an agreement with incomplete 
information, a board may require that they reopen their negotiation to 
address these issues and improve the agreement. While Koontz may 
                                                                                                                     
Rose, New Models, supra note 161, at 1168–70 (describing a model of land use decisions as forms 
of mediation). See generally Jonathan M. Davidson & Susan L. Trevarthen, Land Use Mediation: 
Another Smart Growth Alternative, 33 URB. LAW. 705 (2001) (highlighting recent research and 
examples of mediated land use settlements). 
 297. Special Permits and Site Plan Review for Town of Amenia, NY, GAINING GROUND INFO. 
DATABASE, http://landuse.law.pace.edu/landuse/documents/laws/reg2/AmeniaNY-PreApp&ADR.doc (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2014). 
 298. See, e.g., JOSEPH B. STULBERG & LELA  P. LOVE, MIDDLE VOICE; MEDIATING CONFLICT 
SUCCESSFULLY 23–28 (2009); SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 204, at 140–50; Howard 
Bellman & Susan Podziba, Public Policy Mediation, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2012, at 14; Ane 
D. Deister, Environmental Mediation Strategies for Success: Summaries of Two Consensus-Based 
Cases—Florida’s Growth Management Act Legislation and the Los Angeles River Watershed Task 
Force, 32 URB. LAW. 73, 93 (2000).  
 299. See Organizational Structure, ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MGMT. DISTRICT, 
http://floridaswater.com/organization/organization_chart.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2014). 
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encourage more stakeholder negotiations, not involving the board reduces 
their efficiency. Developers and the community would be better served if 
the board could offer its expertise to the negotiations. 
The confidentiality provisions of mediation may provide an avenue for 
boards to offer suggestions during negotiations. By protecting a board’s 
suggestions through the mediation process, it may be possible to avoid 
missing out on the board’s expertise. Unfortunately, this alternative is 
cumbersome because the actual route to protect a board’s suggestions 
would require a mediator to enter caucus—a separate session—with the 
board to elicit suggestions and then communicate those suggestions to the 
other side as if they came from the mediator.300 The obvious inefficiencies 
of this approach would likely reduce its effectiveness. This option is also 
imperfect because not all mediations can rely on confidentiality 
protections.301 A future court, concerned with protecting landowners from 
extortionate demands, could decide to override any promised 
confidentiality of mediation.302 
C.  Negotiate Without Offering Conditions 
A similarly inefficient alternative for avoiding heightened scrutiny 
would be to allow the board to negotiate but not to make any proposals. 
For example, the board can tell the developer that a proposal does not 
adequately protect wetlands but then not propose any mitigation 
alternatives. In this way, the board never makes a demand and never 
triggers the scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan. If the developer does not change 
the application the board can deny the permit and any Fifth-Amendment 
takings claim by the developer will be subject to Penn Central and not 
Nollan–Dolan. 
If the developer wanted to avoid a denial, she could suggest mitigation 
measures hoping that such an alternative would satisfy the board. The 
complication with this option is how this negotiation would integrate with 
the required decision-making process. If the developer identifies an 
                                                                                                                     
 300. See Richard M. Calkins, Caucus Mediation—Putting Conciliation Back into the Process: 
The Peacemaking Approach to Resolution, Peace, and Healing, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 259, 270, 283 
(2006) (describing the purpose and practice of caucus in mediation). 
 301. Susan Oberman, Confidentiality in Mediation: An Application of the Right to Privacy, 27 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 539, 541 (2012) (“There is no uniformity in confidentiality protections 
between state and federal laws, among the states, or even among localities within states.”); Note, 
Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 441, 441 (1984) (“Under current law, 
however, it is far from clear that a mediator can back up a promise that everything said in mediation 
will remain confidential . . . .”). 
 302. See Maureen A. Weston, Confidentiality’s Constitutionality: The Incursion on Judicial 
Powers to Regulate Party Conduct in Court-Connected Mediation, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 29, 33 
(2003) (“Few . . . statutes, however, acknowledge the authority of a court to override the 
confidentiality privilege to enforce participation orders, address claims of participant misconduct, or 
to prevent abuse of process or professional ethics violations.”). 
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acceptable option, the board cannot commit to an approval prematurely. 
The board is required to follow the required process before rendering a 
binding decision. Doing so would make the board’s decision vulnerable to 
a procedural challenge. While this alternative protects the board from 
heightened scrutiny, this inefficient form of negotiation increases 
transaction costs for all involved. The developer will have to spend more 
time in the approval process. The community will have to wait longer for 
any benefits from the development and may even have to fund litigation. 
The board will waste valuable time playing “hot or cold” with the 
developer instead of addressing other important decisions. 
D.  Negotiate 
A board may decide that negotiating with developers over potential 
exactions is worth the added judicial scrutiny. It can still use the approval 
process to offer suggestions about how to mitigate the impact of a 
proposed development. The majority opinion in Koontz does not prevent 
these conversations. It does, however, require boards to have a greater level 
of certainty—a nexus and rough proportionality—when offering 
suggestions. As a result, municipalities must conduct a rigorous analysis 
before proposing conditions because research indicates that governments 
fail heightened scrutiny half of the time on appeal.303 If the negotiations 
collapse and the developer decides to sue, a court will require the board to 
show that its proposals meet the Nollan–Dolan standard.  
Therefore, boards should only enter into land use negotiations when 
they have reliable and up-to-date information that can justify the nexus and 
rough proportionality requirements,304 and the development promises 
sufficient community benefit to warrant the risk of litigation and a possible 
adverse ruling. This will be difficult in practice since the project details are 
often malleable in the early stages of a development application.  
E.  Insulate Negotiations—Ensure Proposals Do Not Become 
Demands 
Governments may attempt to insulate their negotiations from triggering 
heightened scrutiny by specifying when a proposal becomes a demand. 
                                                                                                                     
 303. See Echeverria, supra note 124, at 7 & n.38 (citing research of appellate decisions 
applying the “rough proportionality” test revealing that the “government flunks the test about half 
the time”). 
 304. If boards do not have this information they can ask developers to provide funds to 
conduct studies. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.9(a)(1) (2014) (“The project 
sponsor or the lead agency, at the project sponsor’s option, will prepare the draft [Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS)]. If the project sponsor does not exercise the option to prepare the draft EIS, 
the lead agency will prepare it, cause it to be prepared or terminate its review of the action. A fee 
may be charged by the lead agency for preparation or review of an EIS pursuant to section 617.13 
of this Part. When the project sponsor prepares the draft EIS, the document must be submitted to 
the lead agency.”). 
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While the Court used imprecise language to define the triggering behavior, 
an argument can be made that Koontz only applies to specific, concrete, 
and definite demands.305 Therefore, indefinite proposals that are not 
concrete and specific are not considered demands. Accordingly, a board 
that specifies when a proposal amounts to a demand may be able to avoid 
being subject to heightened scrutiny. But given the Supreme Court’s 
demonstrated hostility to similar maneuvers in Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz 
the Justices will likely view any efforts to insulate negotiations with 
suspicion. 
Boards may be able to use pre-application processes and development 
agreements to insulate their negotiations.306 Many boards have used pre-
application processes to address important issues before the rigidity of the 
required process interferes with parties’ ability to communicate.307 By 
conducting negotiations before an application is finally accepted, the board 
may be able to avoid heightened scrutiny. A community may create a pre-
negotiation process to explore the impacts of the development and possible 
mitigation measures. Boards can issue a rule explaining that any of the 
ideas in this pre-application problem-solving workshop are not demands 
until they become part of an application.  
One problem with this approach is timing. Early-stage negotiations may 
lack sufficient information to produce mutually agreeable and efficient 
outcomes. In order to understand the true impacts of a project, the board 
needs details about what the developer will build, how she will build it, 
and where. The board must then use that information to identify mitigating 
measures. Further, information about harms may not be available in the 
early stages of the approval process because of inadequate information 
about what is being proposed. Identifying this information takes time and 
money and landowners are only willing to invest those resources if there is 
a reasonable likelihood of success in the approval process. Therefore, 
replacing negotiation opportunities at the end of the process with pre-
application negotiation is problematic because it can leave on the table 
value that might normally be discovered later in the process. 
Another problem with these attempts to insulate is the Court’s concern 
over circumventing the Takings Clause. The majority opinions in Nollan, 
Dolan, and now Koontz, make it clear that boards cannot do indirectly 
                                                                                                                     
 305. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2598 (2013). 
 306. Compare Callies et al., supra note 83, at 17–18 (suggesting that development 
agreements—agreements between government and landowners that lock land use regulations in 
place for a discrete time frame—can also be used to insulate development negotiations), with 
Callies & Tappendorf, supra note 222, at 681–83 (arguing that in order for developer agreements to 
offer widespread relief from the pressures of Koontz, they must be authorized by a well-drafted 
statute, and noting that only thirteen states permit their use). 
 307. See, e.g., Peter A. Buchsbaum, Bibliography, Permit Coordination Study by the Lincoln 
Institute of Land Policy, 36 URB. LAW. 191, 218 (2004) (summarizing a study that points out the 
benefits of pre-application processes). 
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what they cannot do directly.308 If boards cannot avoid the Fifth 
Amendment using a proposed condition prior to a decision, will courts 
allow them to do so using a proposed condition before the developer 
submits an application? Again, this lack of clarity comes from the Court’s 
unwillingness to define what amounts to a demand. Identifying the moment 
that transforms a “proposal” to a “demand” will be very difficult for 
boards.  
How does a board know when its proposal crosses the threshold of 
specificity and concreteness? Is it when the board specifically incorporates 
the condition into an application as a written alternative? Is it when the 
board makes a condition with concreteness to measure the impact? While 
proposals offered in a pre-application process may not be adequately 
concrete and specific, any affirmative statement that they are is conjecture 
subject to a contrary ruling by a reviewing court. 
Another option for insulating negotiation is to ask the developer to 
waive her right to a compensated taking.309 Professor Daniel Farber 
suggests that this type of a waiver may be permissible under certain 
circumstances: “Despite the Declaration of Independence’s proclamation 
of inalienable rights, constitutional rights are indeed alienable in the sense 
that they can be waived in return for various benefits. . . . [T]he right to a 
jury trial can be surrendered in return for a lighter sentence as part of a plea 
bargain.”310  
Could the right to be justly compensated be surrendered in return for an 
approval to build a noncompliant development? Professor Farber 
concludes that ultimately the Court’s rulings dealing with development 
conditions are not likely to permit the possibility of a waiver unless revised 
by future Courts.311 Since these are essentially the facts of Nollan, Dolan, 
and Koontz, he is probably correct. Based on the opinions in those cases, it 
                                                                                                                     
 308. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598–99 (“[I]f the government had directly seized the 
easements it sought to obtain through the permitting process, it would have committed a per se 
taking.”); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (“[H]ad the city simply required 
petitioner to dedicate a strip of land along Fanno Creek for public use, rather than conditioning the 
grant of her permit to redevelop her property on such a dedication, a taking would have occurred.”); 
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (“Had California simply required the 
Nollans to make an easement across their beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis in 
order to increase public access to the beach, rather than conditioning their permit to rebuild their 
house on their agreeing to do so, we have no doubt there would have been a taking.”); Sullivan, 
supra note 59, at 1505 (describing how Nollan fits with the other unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine cases and reiterating the Court’s conclusion that “[b]eing offered a building permit on the 
condition that one surrender an easement to the public clearly pressures the right against 
uncompensated taking if ‘direct’ requisition of the easement would constitute a taking”). 
 309. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional 
Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913 (2006) (raising the question of when 
and how the right to a constitutional protection can be waived). 
 310. Id. at 914 (footnotes omitted).  
 311. See id. at 951.  
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is hard to imagine how a waiver would be seen as anything but 
“extortionate” behavior. However, until that question is answered, some 
land use boards may decide that requesting a waiver is a worthwhile 
alternative to forgoing negotiation. 
CONCLUSION 
Koontz will certainly not kill land use negotiations. Developers and 
land use boards receive too many benefits from the creative bargaining that 
negotiations allow. However, Koontz changes the balance of power among 
the parties, so some retreat from negotiation is inevitable. The Court’s 
decision in Koontz severely limits the ability of land use boards to work 
with developers who present noncompliant proposals. According to Coy 
Koontz Jr., the decision “will give [developers] a bigger stick to take into 
court in the future to fight these types of cases.”312 It is hard to imagine a 
future in which land use boards do not retreat from negotiations over 
noncompliant applications.  
Hopefully, future courts will provide more guidance on what types of 
behaviors amount to demands triggering Nollan–Dolan scrutiny. The only 
definition given by the Supreme Court is that demands for property are 
definite, concrete, and specific.313 There is no guidance beyond the plain 
meaning of these words. Future courts may be able to provide further 
guidance as to the meanings of these words.  
One of the many questions after Koontz is whether the Court’s efforts to 
protect a few developers from potentially extortionate behavior will harm a 
much greater number of developers. This Article argues that it will. Post-
Koontz boards must now spend more time and money ensuring that 
proposed development conditions meet the same rigorous standard as 
imposed conditions under Nollan and Dolan. Sensible boards will 
construct protection around their development negotiations to ensure that 
suggestions are only made when they can satisfy the heightened standard of 
scrutiny. These increased protections may reduce the likelihood that boards 
use development processes for illegitimate and extortionate purposes; 
however, the increased transaction costs will undoubtedly place more 
burdens—and costs—on developers, planners, and municipalities. 
                                                                                                                     
 312. Jacobs, supra note 30.  
 313. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598. 
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